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IS OHIO JUVENILE JUSTICE STILL SERVING ITS PURPOSE?  
by  
SUSAN A. BURNS  
We read about it in the newspapers: "Prosecutors Seek Adult Trial for Boy, 14, in Mall 
Shooting."1 We see and hear about it on television: "Debate over Making Juveniles Stand 
Trial as Adults for Crimes."2 It happens in our states, in our cities, and even in our own 
backyards: "Police Arrest Three Teen-Agers in Elderly Woman's Death."3 Juvenile crime. 
Increasingly, America's youth are committing more and more violent crime.  
On a national level in 1992, juveniles 4 accounted for 112,409 of the 641,250 violent 
crime arrests.5 America's juveniles committed 16.3 % of the murders in the country and 
17.5% of the total violent crimes in the United States in 1992.6 In Ohio alone, those 17 
years of age and younger comprised 12% of Ohio's total arrests for murder in 1992, and 
20% of violent crime arrests.7  
How are juvenile courts responding to these frightening statistics? Should we abandon 
the juvenile system altogether and transfer our children to adult courts, adult prisons, and 
death row? Is the criteria Ohio and other states use to determine such transfers objective, 
or does it permit too much judicial discretion?  
This Comment begins with an introduction to the history and purpose of the juvenile 
justice system, and the procedure for transferring juveniles to adult courts. Part II 
discusses the United States Supreme Court cases that began eroding the original purpose 
of the juvenile court by affording juveniles some of the same constitutional rights 
enjoyed by adult offenders. Part III focuses on Ohio's present juvenile transfer procedure 
to adult court, discuss ing the broad discretionary power given to juvenile court judges in 
electing to do so. Part IV describes the criteria Ohio juvenile court judges use to de 
termine whether to transfer juveniles, showing its subjectivity and possible need for 
restraint. Part V provides information on Ohio's new legislation in juvenile law, effective 
January 1, 1996. This Comment concludes with sug gestions to reform the juvenile 
justice system and help it to return to accom plishing its original goal: helping children to 
cope with their problems and to deter them from delinquent behaviors.  
I. JUVENILE COURT HISTORY AND PURPOSE  
The practice of having separate courts for juveniles originated in the United States as a 
result of two significant events: the Industrial Revolution 8 and the Progressive 
Movement.9 Prior to these events, the law treated children in the same manner as adults, 
and at times housed juvenile offenders in the same institutions as adult offenders.10 In 
1899, Illinois established the first juvenile court 11 and, by 1925, every state but two had 
established juvenile courts.12 By 1945, every state had some type of juvenile court in 
place.13  
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The initial underlying philosophy of the juvenile court system was parens patriae.14 This 
philosophy sought to rehabilitate juveniles 15 and treat the child "not as a criminal, but as 
a child needing care, education and protection. "16 Juvenile court judges served to protect 
juveniles as they were thought unable to care for themselves.17 The juvenile system itself 
sought to protect the child, through both its focus on treatment and its less decriminalized 
pro cedural terminology.18 The juvenile system and its parens patriae philosophy 
remained relatively stable from its inception in 1899 through 1966.19 In fact, the United 
States Supreme Court never decided a juvenile court case until 1966,20 when it decided 
Kent v. United States.21 Kent and its progeny initiated a re-examination of the juvenile 
system's philosophy and procedure, and the lack of constitutional rights afforded to its 
offenders.  
Transfer of Juvenile Cases to Adult Courts History and Rationale  
The procedure of transferring jurisdiction from juvenile court to adult court has existed 
since the establishment of the juvenile court in 1899.22 The underlying philosophy of 
transfer proceedings was to evaluate the likelihood that a child could be rehabilitated 
within the juvenile justice system.23 While trying to embrace most juveniles with its 
ability to rehabilitate, the juvenile system still recognized that there were some juveniles 
beyond its reach.24 The law vested juvenile court judges with sole authority to determine 
whether juveniles should be transferred to the adult system.25 Thus, transfer proceedings 
allow a juvenile court judge to determine if the child is amenable to treat ment within its 
confines and, if not, to send those unamenable to the offerings of juvenile rehabilitation 
to the adult courts.26  
The number of juveniles transferred to adult court today has increased astronomically 
from the amount of children transferred when the juvenile sys tem was first established.27 
Some authorities believe that this increase has resulted from a changing view of children 
and their mental reasoning abilities.28 Others suggest that the juvenile court uses transfer 
to set an example to other juveniles, and to appease the public demand for justice when 
children commit serious crimes.29 Still others believe that transfer is used more often 
today because of its tremendous deterrent effect, as juveniles are fearful of adult courts.30  
II. SIGNIFICANT U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES REGARDING JUVENILES  
In 1966, the Supreme Court took its first juvenile case, Kent v. United States.31 It 
involved transferring a juvenile case to adult criminal court for adjudication.32 The 
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Fortas, ruled the transfer procedure invalid 
because it was done without a hearing, without assistance of counsel and without the 
judge stating his reasons for transfer.33 The Court also recognized the significance of the 
transfer procedure.34 While the Court acknowledged the substantial latitude given to the 
juvenile court in determining if it should retain jurisdiction over a juvenile, it stressed that 
this latitude is not a "license for arbitrary procedure" by the court.35 Thus, in Kent, the 
Court began to recognize that constitutional rights given to adult offenders, such as due 
process, should exist in the juvenile court system as well- especially in transfer 
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proceedings.36 The juvenile court was beginning to act as a court rather than a parent in 
affording its offenders constitutional rights enjoyed by adult offenders.37  
In an appendix to its decision, the Kent Court enumerated factors that a juvenile court 
judge might evaluate in deciding whether or not to transfer a juvenile to adult court.38 The 
Court specifically noted that not all factors will apply in each case, but staff of the 
juvenile court must fully develop all avail able information relating to the factors when a 
transfer proceeding is the issue. Many states, including Ohio, incorporated these factors 
into their statutes and juvenile rules.  
The next case to come before the Supreme Court was In re Gault,39 another case blurring 
the distinctions between the juvenile and adult courts. It incorporated adult constitutional 
rights into the juvenile courts, further eviscerating the parens patriae philosophy.40 The 
Supreme Court, in an opinion again penned by Justice Fortas, held that all juveniles were 
entitled to a constitutional right to: (1) notice;41 (2) counsel;42 (3) confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses;43 and (4) invoking the privilege against self-in crimination.44 
The Court maintained that its decision would not destroy the juvenile justice system, 
although it drastically altered it.45 The Court further limited its holding to only the 
adjudicatory hearing to delinquency proceed ings, where a criminal violation is alleged 
and confinement may occur.46  
In In re Winship,47 a 1970 case, the Supreme Court held that the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard of proof applied to the adjudicatory stage of delinquency cases where a 
child's liberty was at stake.48 The Court returned to the same reasons set forth in Gault to 
justify its decision.49 Although the Court again stressed that its decision to provide 
juveniles with similar constitutional safeguards as adult offenders would not dismantle 
the juvenile system's philosophy and procedure, this case and its progeny eroded many 
areas in the juvenile court. The juvenile court judge's role was no longer protectorate 
parent of the children. Instead, a rigid, more adult-like atmo sphere attached to the 
juvenile system.50  
The case of Breed v. Jones51 applied yet another adult offender constitutional right to 
juvenile courts; that of the protection against Double Jeopardy.52 Justice Burger and the 
Majority held that jeopardy attached when the juvenile court started hearing evidence at 
its adjudicatory proceeding.53 The Supreme Court thus determined that the waiver 
hearing must occur prior to an adjudicatory hearing, or double jeopardy is violated.54  
However, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania55 marked a departure by the Supreme Court in its 
willingness to afford adult constitutional rights to juvenile offenders.56 Holding that the 
right to trial by jury did not apply to juvenile offenders in any juvenile procedure,57 
Justice Blackmun returned to the initial reasons for the juvenile justice system: parens 
patriae and rehabilitation and treatment of the juvenile.58 The Supreme Court feared that 
a jury trial would mesh the juvenile and adult systems together in such a way as to end 
the juvenile court informalities, and allow the adversarial procedures of the adult system 
to dominate.59  
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This line of Supreme Court cases afforded juveniles most of the constitutional rights 
granted to adult offenders. The Kent decision provided constitutional due process and 
Gault conferred juveniles the rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination 
and self-incrimination protection. The Supreme Court's holding in Winship established a 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in juvenile adjudicatory hearings, and Breed 
granted juvenile offenders the protection against double jeopardy. The McKeiver decision 
contained the one constitutional right the Supreme Court refused to extend to juvenile 
offenders, the right to a jury trial.  
Recently, critics have become increasingly dissatisfied with the juvenile system, as they 
feel it is too soft on juvenile offenders.60 They believe this has resulted from allowing 
juveniles "the best of both worlds;"61 adult constitutional protections within the parens 
patriae philosophy of the juvenile system. A skyrocketing increase in juvenile violent 
crimes has also contributed to discontentment with the juvenile system.62 As a result of 
this growing d iscontent and a "get tough" philosophy, juvenile courts are increasing the 
use of the transfer procedure, so that the adult courts can impose greater and harsher 
punishments on convicted juveniles.63  
III. OHIO'S JUVENILE SYSTEM AND TRANSFER -- PAST AND PRESENT  
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized the parens patriae doctrine as early as 1869.64 
Shortly thereafter, Ohio became one of the first states to enact juvenile legislation when it 
established the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court in 1902,65 and expanded the system 
throughout the state by 1906.66 Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Gault, juvenile court procedure did not extend the constitutional guarantees afforded 
adults in the criminal system.67 As a result of the Gault decision, the legislature altered 
the Ohio Juvenile Code and, in 1968, adopted the Modern Courts Amendment to the 
Ohio Constitution, allowing the Ohio Supreme Court the authority to make procedural 
rules.68 As a result of this amendment, the Court created the Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure.69 In 1994, the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure were revised to make the 
Rules conform with statutory changes in the Ohio Revised Code.70  
Both Ohio Revised Code section 2151.26 and Juvenile Rule 30 govern Ohio's juvenile 
transfer proceedings.71 Both recognize the juvenile judge's discretionary transfer ability,72 
holding that the judge must find reasonable grounds to believe that: (1) the child is not 
amenable to rehabilitation or further care in any juvenile delinquent facility; and (2) the 
safety of the com munity may require legal restraint for a period extending beyond the 
child's majority.73 A judge must further consider the violence of the act and whether the 
victim is elderly or disabled.74  
Ohio affords the juvenile offender the constitutional rights resulting from Kent v. United 
States, In Re Gault, In Re Winship, and Breed v. Jones.75 The juvenile is not given a jury 
trial in Ohio, just as the United States Supreme Court ruled in McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania.76  
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In a discretionary transfer proceeding in Ohio, two hearings are held; a preliminary 
hearing 77 and a second hearing to determine amenability to juvenile treatment.78 This 
hearing allows the juvenile judge the discretion to determine whether to transfer the 
juvenile to adult court. Ohio also has a mandatory transfer proceeding, where the juvenile 
judge must transfer to criminal court a juvenile who has committed aggravated murder or 
murder when the court determines that: (1) probable cause exists to believe that the child 
committed the act; and (2) the court had previously adjudicated the juvenile for 
aggravated murder or murder.79  
Subjective Discretion of Ohio Juvenile Judges in Transfer  
Although the law requires juvenile court judges to consider specific factors in 
determining amenability to treatment 80 and the safety of the community, the individual 
judge possesses almost unbridled discretion in this evaluation and final determination, 
especially with respect to the criteria for determining amenability to rehabilitation.81 This 
discretion is subjective, based on each judge's opinion regarding the proper weight to 
attach to each factor of the transfer-decision criteria, if the judge even considers all of the 
criteria.82 Further, the enumerated criteria for rehabilitation, although mandating that the 
judge "shall" consider them, are not the only guides a judge may use in making a transfer 
decision. Any other relevant circumstances can be considered.83 Although the judge must 
state the reasons for the transfer,84 the weight assigned each factor will not necessarily be 
reflected in the trans fer order, as the judge is not required to express the weight given 
each of the factors.85 This leaves the juvenile in a vulnerable position. The place of 
sentencing will depend solely on a judge's preference for certain transfer criteria over 
others, as well as preference for the transfer procedure itself, and no adequate checks 
exist on the judge's decision.86  
With such broad judicial discretion, the potential for abuse of transfer 87 and inconsistent 
transfer 88 is great. By determining whether to transfer the minor, the juvenile court judge 
will also determine where the juvenile will ultimately be punished, either in a juvenile 
facility where treatment is directed at rehabilitation,89 or an adult facility, where 
retribution and punishment are often the focus.90 Such a decision undoubtedly will affect 
the direction of the juvenile's life.  
If transferred to criminal court and sentenced to an adult facility, both the juvenile and 
society feel dramatic impacts. The juvenile's physical and emotional well-being will be 
greatly affected as he may be forced to spend time with adult prison offenders.91 Society 
feels the aftermath of the juvenile's adult confinement as, upon his return to society, the 
juvenile has become a harder, more violent 92 and recidivistic offender. Further, 
sentencing of juveniles to adult facilities offers no guarantee of a reduction in the juvenile 
crime rate, as stricter adult crime policies have not reduced the adult crime rate 
whatsoever; in fact, the adult crime rate has increased significantly.93 The only effect 
harsher and stricter policies have provided the nation is a quadrupling in the number of 
persons imprisoned since 1980,94 inordinate spending on the building of more prisons 95 
and a world-renowned reputation as the country with the highest rate of incarceration 96 
with a total prison population of 1.1 million.97  
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Thus, a juvenile court judge's unbridled and unchecked decision to transfer a juvenile to 
an adult court that imposes adult commitment will only add to already overcrowded, 
overspent and overburdened adult system and institutions. It will return to society more 
violent offenders and result in in creased crime.98  
With statistics like those mentioned, it is obvious that change is necessary. While the 
juvenile system's adversaries argue for its complete abolition,99  
proponents argue for its reform.100 Others argue for a restriction on the juvenile court 
judge's discretion in making the transfer decision.101 However, this will only push the 
juvenile problems off to the already overtaxed and ineffec tive adult system, with no 
guarantee of crime rate reduction in either area.102 Further, if it is remembered that the 
juvenile system's aim is to rehabilitate and treat the child,103 the juvenile court judge's 
discretion should not be so limited that accomplishment of the system's goals is rendered 
impossible. Despite the juvenile system's aims, Ohio's new legislation reflects the trend 
toward the "get tough" philosophy on crime by restricting the discretion of the juvenile 
court judge in transfer decisions.104  
Ohio's New Juvenile Legislation  
The Ohio Legislature has amended Ohio Revised Code section 2151.26 as a step toward 
reforming the juvenile system and to appease the public's out rage with juvenile crime.105 
This amendment imposes restraints on the  
juvenile judge's current transfer power in two ways. First, it mandates juvenile transfer 
under more circumstances than the current statute.106 Secondly, it imposes additional 
factors for a judge to consider that favor transfer of a juvenile to adult court.107  
The current mandatory transfer statute provides that a judge must transfer the juvenile to 
adult court after it finds probable cause exists to believe the child committed the act 
charged, and only when the child has a previous adjudication of an act constituting 
murder or aggravated murder if done by an adult.108 The new amendment restricts not 
only the judge's discretion regard ing transfer based on the age of the juvenile offender,109 
but also limits the judge's discretion regarding the offenses for which the judge may 
decide transfer will occur. The effect of the new mandatory bind-over provisions on the 
Department of Youth Services 110 and the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections 
111 has been analyzed, and suggests a substantial savings for the former and a moderate 
expenditure for the latter (assuming no additional facility space is necessary).112 The 
mandatory transfer decision has its opponents 113 and supporters,114 but appears to 
indicate a step in the right direction as it removes the older, repeat violent offenders from 
the juvenile system.  
The second restraint on the juvenile judge's power to transfer involves the discretionary 
or permissive bind-over procedures.115 The amendment requires a juvenile judge to 
continue to consider those factors enumerated in the current statute,116 but also specifies 
that if certain criteria exist, the judge must favor transfer of the juvenile to adult court.117 
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The enumerated criteria are not subjectively-based factors, such as those in Juvenile Rule 
30,118 but are factors that are determined as objective facts.119 Thus, a juvenile court 
cannot hide its own subjectivity behind these criteria when a transfer decision is made, or 
the juvenile offender is kept within the juvenile system. The fiscal effect of this revision 
is minimal.120  
Another reform to the current juvenile statute worth mentioning is in the area of adult 
courts imposing sentences on juvenile offenders bound over to them. The current 
legislation allows for juveniles to be housed with adult offenders,121 while the new 
legislation mandates that the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections separate those 
juveniles between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years from the adult population.122  
Juvenile System's Identity Crisis and Waste of Resources: Solutions  
Ohio is making a great effort to work toward a solution to the juvenile system's identity 
and philosophy problems through this new legislation. It restricts judicial discretion in 
some respects,123 but leaves discretion untouched in areas where it is most necessary.124 
Additional reform is necessary, especially in conserving juvenile treatment and resources 
for those on whom it works best.  
Although experts have suggested many solutions to the problems of ineffective juvenile 
justice, from total abolition of the system 125 to leaving the system as it is,126 some court 
officials recognize that the system accomplishes its goals with those offenders it was 
intended to help, but fails the repeat violent offender who it was not designed to serve.127 
If the juvenile system continues to allow these repeat violent offenders to stay within its 
confines, it is only depleting its time, energy and resources, and neglecting those it was 
designed to serve; the first-time, nonviolent child that makes a mistake.128  
Based on the premise that the juvenile system was created to deal only with certain types 
of juvenile offenders, the best solution to reinstate the juvenile court's identity is to create 
a transitional system for the repeat violent juvenile offender.129 This will remove the 
strain from the current juvenile system, yet still recognize and respect that the minor is a 
child and not a criminal.130 However, Ohio's juvenile system, as that of most states, does 
not possess the extra funding to create such a system.131 Perhaps the money saved each 
year in the juvenile treatment and adjudication areas from the implementation of 
mandatory transfers could be applied toward the creation of the transitional system,132 
which will still remain a part of the juvenile system, yet be separate and apart with its 
own court system and sentencing unit.133  
IV. CONCLUSION  
Juvenile justice is alive, well and starting to revive in Ohio. Ohio has begun the 
transformation of the juvenile court back to its original philosophy by providing for 
mandatory transfers in cases of serious repeat juvenile of fenders. Though it limits the 
discretion of juvenile judges, it also reflects the philosophy of the system that the juvenile 
court serves to protect and treat the child.134 By limiting the discretion of the juvenile 
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court in such situations, the new legislation is only recognizing what the first juvenile 
court recognized in 1899: that certain juvenile offenders were beyond its reach.135 
Perhaps the next step in Ohio juvenile law reform will be to provide a transitional system 
for those beyond the reach of the system.136  
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1. John Gillie, Prosecutors Seek Adult Trial for Boy, 14, In Mall Shooting, THE NEWS 
TRIB., Aug. 30, 1995, at B4.  
2. NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 20, 1994), available at 1994 WL 
3519114 (discussing how Houston, Texas is dealing with young violent offenders by 
requesting juvenile judges to certify the young offenders to stand trial as adults for their 
crimes).  
3. Police Arrest 3 Teen-Agers in Elderly Woman's Death From Wire Reports, THE PLAIN 
DEALER, Oct. 22, 1993, at 3B. In Austintown, Ohio, police arrested three seventeen-
year-old boys who beat Rose Bertolini, age 72, to death after she arrived home and 
interrupted a burglary in progress. Id.  
4. The term "juveniles" in this Comment refers to those persons under the age of eighteen 
years old.  
5. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1993) [hereinafter Sourcebook]. Violent crimes include 
the crimes of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, according to the 
U.S. Department of Justice. See SOURCEBOOK. Table 4.8 in the Sourcebook charts a 
breakdown of arrests, by offenses charged and age, for 1992 in the United States. Id. Of 
the 11,893,153 total arrests made in 1992, juveniles constituted 1,943,138 of that group, 
with those under 15 years old representing 689,877 of the persons arrested. Id. at Table 
4.8. What staggering statistics for our country.  
6. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5. Those under the age of 15 committed 5.3% of the violent 
crimes, while those 13-14 years old committed 3.9%. Id. The SOURCEBOOK even depicts 
a 1.2% listing for those children aged 10-12 years old for violent crime, and a .2% listing 
for those under the age of 10. Id.  
7. CRIME STATE RANKINGS 1994: CRIME IN THE 50 UNITED STATES 40 (Kathleen 
O'Leary et al. eds., 1994). In 1992, Ohio ranked 26th out of the 50 states in its reported 
arrests of minors for murder, and 19th of the 50 states in reported arrests of minors for 
violent crimes. Id.  
Locally, in 1994, Summit County Juvenile Court reported 3,922 official delinquency 
cases filed and 1,560 status offender cases. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, COUNTY OF 
SUMMIT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, Juvenile Division (1994). A child is considered 
delinquent when he is under the age of 18 years and violates a law or regulation that 
would be a crime if committed by an adult. A child is defined as a status offender when 
he violates a law that applies only to a child, such as truancy. Id.  
In 1993, Mahoning County Juvenile Court reported 1,357 official delinquency cases and 
128 "unruly" or status offender cases. 1992-1993 BIANNUAL REPORT, MAHONING 
COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, Juvenile Court Division (1993). In 1992, 
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Mahoning County reported 208 arrests of juveniles for homicide and assault crimes, with 
8 of those juvenile arrests for murder. 1992 REPORT ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
OFFENSES, MAHONING COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, Juvenile Court Division 
(1992).  
8. DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL 
COURTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 35 (1991). The Industrial 
Revolution not only transformed America from a predominately agricultural economy to 
one based on factories, but it also brought European immigrants to the United States to 
work in the industrial trades. Id. The Progressives worried about and wanted to help the 
children that these immigrants brought with them, as they often wandered the streets, 
leading wasteful, crime-ridden lives. Id.  
9. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 8, at 35, 38. The Progressive sought two objectives 
from their "Child Saving Movement" to help the immigrant children: to instill the 
appropriate moral values in the children, and to temper the harsh treatment of juveniles 
by the law. Id. The Progressives felt that the law should recognize one's age as a 
mitigating circumstance. Id.  
10. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 8, at 38. The courts did not discriminate between 
child and adult offenders in determining capacity to commit a crime or the severity of the 
punishment. Id. Thus, children who committed murder were tried as adults for murder. 
However, common law principles of mental capacity developed to relieve children in 
different age groups from criminal responsibility for their acts. See FRANCIS B. 
MCCARTHY & JAMES G. CARR, JUVENILE LAWS AND ITS PROCESSES (1980). Common 
law established three categories of capacity regarding age. First, children under age 7 
lacked capacity to commit criminal acts. Id. Second, the law presumed that children 
between ages 7 and 14 possessed no capacity to commit criminal acts, but it was a 
rebuttable presumption. Id. Finally, the law held those children 14 years old and above to 
the same standards of capacity and responsibility for criminal acts as adults. Id. For 
application of such principles, see State v. Mary Doherty, 2 Tenn. 79 (1806) (12-year-old 
girl indicted for murder of her father).  
11. Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131. The Act contained four 
features that influenced the juvenile court system. WILLIAM A. KURTZ & PAUL C. 
GIANELLI, OHIO JUVENILE LAW 9 (3d ed. 1994). The Act established distinct procedures 
for juvenile cases; developed a separate court for those children under 16 years who were 
alleged delinquent, neglected or dependent; equipped probation officers with 
investigatory and supervisory powers over juveniles and their cases; and forbade 
detention of a child under age 12 and mandated segregation of adults and juveniles when 
housed in the same facility. Id.  
12. Charles Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal 
and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 451 (1985). The only two 
states that had not created juvenile courts in 1925 were Maine and Wyoming. Id.  
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13. Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 12, at 451. Even the federal system had some form of 
juvenile system at this time.  
14. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 10. Parens patriae means literally "parent of 
the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). It means that "the state is 
the higher or the ultimate parent of all of the dependents within its borders." Julian Mack, 
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). The early reformers envisioned the 
parens patriae concept as one where the State acted as parent for juveniles in its system 
and treated juvenile delinquency as a disease. Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles 
Accountable: Reforming America's "Juvenile Injustice System ," 22 PEPP. L. REV. 907 
(1995). The Reformers believed that the State should play the role of doctor, diagnosing 
and treating the child's delinquency "disease" with expert help to cure it. Id. Reformers 
justified separation of juveniles from society and adult offenders based on the idea that 
the "disease" of delinquency may be contagious and treatment of the disease may require 
separation to assure its success. Id.  
15. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 10. It was noted at the time that the purpose of 
the juvenile justice system "is not to punish but to save." Id. (citing Flexner & 
Oppenheimer, The Legal Aspect of the Juvenile Court, 9 Children's Bureau Pub. No. 99 
(1922)).  
16. HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1927). The 
Reformers reasoned that separate juvenile courts were necessary because the adult 
criminal courts' primary focus was not the best interests of this particular child, but 
whether the individual committed the crime. Mack, supra note 14, at 107.  
17. Allison Boyce, Note, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker v. 
State, 46 ARK. L. REV. 985 (1994). The juvenile judge's role was not to determine guilt 
or innocence, but to "prescribe treatment." Id. at 987.  
18. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 8, at 38. Warrants for arrest in the juvenile system 
are termed petitions, trials are called hearings, and sentences are dispositions. Id. The 
juvenile court also protects its offenders through informally-held private hearings, with 
all players in the system focusing mainly on ways to help the child. Id. The proceedings 
are non-adversarial, as all parties are acting in the best interests of the child. Id. at 39.  
19. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 12. Authorities describe this time as one 
where:  
[J]uvenile courts operated without legal oversight or monitoring. Many 
would say that juvenile courts in this period were not really courts at all. 
There was little or no place for law, lawyers, reporters and the usual 
paraphernalia of courts; this is not at all surprising because the proponents 
of the Juvenile Court movement had specifically rejected legal institutions 
as appropriate to the rehabilitation of children.  
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WADLINGTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
198 (1983).  
20. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 12.  
21. 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding certain constitutional rights afforded adults in the 
criminal justice system applied to juveniles in the juvenile justice system).  
22. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 137. Transfer of jurisdiction, also known as 
waiver, certification or bind-over, involves a juvenile court surrendering its jurisdiction 
over a juvenile case and transferring it to the criminal court for adjudication. Id. All states 
allow this practice, but each vary in its procedure and standards for determining if 
transfer should occur. Id. There are two types of waiver statutes judicial waiver and 
legislative offense exclusion. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile 
Court , 75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991). Judicial waiver involves a juvenile court hearing 
where the judge determines if cause exists to believe the juvenile committed a crime, his 
amenability to the rehabilitative efforts of the juvenile system and the threat to public 
safety. Id. at 491; MCCARTHY & CARR, supra note 10, at 365. Many argue that such 
authority vested in a juvenile court judge is too subjective and without basis, as the 
juvenile court judge lacks the clinical means and ability to predict future dangerousness 
of the juvenile and his/her threat to public safety. Feld, supra, at 703-04. Legislative 
exclusion of the offense provides the juvenile judge with no power to determine if the 
case belongs in juvenile or adult court. Id. Rather, the legislature excludes juveniles 
charged with certain, usually severe, offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. Id. at 706.  
23. Wallace J. Mlyniec, Juvenile Delinquent or Adult Convict The Prosecutor's Choice , 
14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 30-31 (1976). The transfer proceeding represents a "safety 
valve" for the juvenile court because it allows the juvenile judge to send juveniles who 
are unamenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile treatment period (usually until age 
21) to the adult courts. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is 
There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57, 62-63 (1992).  
24. Boyce, supra note 17, at 987. However, only under the most extreme circumstances 
has transfer to adult courts occurred. CHAMPION & MAYS , supra note 8, at 60-61. These 
circumstances include cases where juveniles have committed violent, personal offenses, 
such as heinous crimes or aggravated crimes, or older juvenile offenders who have a 
long, extensive history in the juvenile system and are not responding to the juvenile 
treatments. Id.  
25. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 8, at 61. This authorization left juvenile judges with 
unlimited discretion in transferring juveniles to adult courts. Id. The Kent decision 
reduced this discretion and altered the juvenile court system. Id. at 62.  
26. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 137. The purpose of the transfer proceedings, 
as an Ohio court described it, is:  
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[T]o protect the public in those cases where rehabilitation appears unlikely 
and circumstances indicate that if the charge is ultimately established 
society would be better served by the criminal process by reason of the 
greater security which may be achieved or the deterring effect which that 
process is thought to accomplish. 
In re Mack, 260 N.E.2d 619, 620-21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970).  
27. The number of juveniles transferred to adult court per year by a county, during the 
time when juvenile court was first established, averaged around fifteen cases, or one 
percent of the total amount of juvenile cases. See Feld, infra note 59. That number has 
significantly increased with the "get tough" philosophy demanded by the public. The 
National Center for Juvenile Justice estimated that approximately 176,000 juvenile cases 
were transferred to adult courts nationwide. Joanne C. Lin et al., Youth Violence: 
Redefining the Problem, Rethinking the Solutions, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 357, 366 
(1994) (citing AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE AND 
YOUTH: PSYCHOLOGY'S RESPONSE 42 (1993)). This estimate excludes cases where a 
prosecutor directly filed in adult court, bypassing the juvenile system altogether, or those 
cases automatically heard in adult court due to the legislative offense exclusion. Smith & 
Dabiri, infra note 61.  
28. Mark Dowie, When Kids Commit Adult Crimes, Some Say They Should do Adult Time 
,13 CALIF. LAW. 55, 58 (1993). The author observes that "[a] new conceptual 
framework is emerging that seems to assume contemporary children not only act but 
reason like adults. Commit a heinous crime, and you are an adult for the purpose of 
prosecution." Id.  
29. Feld, supra note 22, at 706. Feld notes that:  
[J]udicial waiver serves important political and organizational functions 
for juvenile courts. By relinquishing a small fraction of its clientele and 
portraying these juveniles as the most intractable and dangerous in the 
system, juvenile courts create symbolic scapegoats, appear to protect the 
public, preserve their jurisdiction over the vast bulk of juveniles, and 
deflect more comprehensive criticisms.  
Id.  
30. Randall W. Besta & Paul J. Wintemute, Young Offenders in Adult Court: Are We 
Moving in the Right Direction?, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 476, 488 (1988). The authors suggest that 
inherent benefits exist in transferring juveniles to adult court, such as deterrence, as most 
juveniles are afraid of going to adult court, and the fact that if the case is transferred, a 
criminal court judge is believed more capable than a juvenile judge of determining who is 
dangerous to society.  
Id.  
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31. 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (initiating the idea that juveniles were entitled to constitutional 
rights enjoyed by adults in the criminal court system). The opinion referred to the 
constitutional rights of due process when Justice Fortas stated, "we do hold that the 
[transfer] hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." Id. 
at 562.  
32. Id. at 552. Sixteen-year-old Morris Kent was arrested after his fingerprints, taken on a 
previous visit to the juvenile court, were found in the apartment of a woman who was 
raped and robbed by an unknown intruder. Police interrogated him for seven straight 
hours without notifying his parents that he was in custody, and without notifying the 
court that Morris was in custody. This was a violation of the District of Columbia's 
juvenile code. Id. at 544 n.1. Other violations of the code included detention of Morris in 
a receiving home for one week without arraignment, lack of judicial determination of 
probable cause for arresting Morris and waiver of Morris' juvenile case to adult court. Id. 
at 545-47. The juvenile court judge ordered waiver to adult court without expressed 
reasons, despite contrary recommendations by a defense psychiatrist and Juvenile Court 
staff, as well as a Juvenile Probation report and a Social Service file unavailable to 
defense at the time a motion was made to see the file. Id. at 547. Further, the juvenile 
court judge entered an order stating that, after full investigation, he was waiving 
jurisdiction to adult court, but made no findings whatsoever for such an investigation. Id. 
at 546.  
33. Id. at 552, 556. The Court did not decide whether Kent should have been transferred, 
as it vacated the court of appeals affirmance of the district court's order and remanded the 
case back to the district court for a de novo hearing on the waiver issue. Id. at 565. If that 
court finds waiver inappropriate, then it should vacate Kent's conviction. If that court 
rules waiver appropriate, then the court may make a judgment after ruling on motions by 
each party. Id.  
34. Id. at 556. "It is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of jurisdiction is a 'critically 
important' action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile." Id. One 
commentator, discussing the importance of the transfer proceeding, stated: "[t]he critical 
nature of such a proceeding is symbolized by the fact that the first juvenile case to draw 
the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court was a transfer of jurisdiction in Kent v. 
United States." Robert E. Shepard, Jr., Transfer of Waiver of Jurisdiction, CRIM. JUST. 
28, 29 (1988).  
35. Kent, 383 U.S. at 553 ("At the outset, it [juvenile court latitude] assumes procedural 
regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of 
due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a 'full 
investigation.'").  
36. Id. at 554 ("[B]ut there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such 
tremendous consequences without ceremony without hearing, without effective 
assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons."). The Court reasoned that if the 
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adult courts would not conduct proceedings in this manner, then the juvenile court, with 
its particular protections for children, would certainly not allow this procedure. Id.  
37. Martin, supra note 23, at 67. This case obligated the states' juvenile courts to afford 
constitutional due process when deciding whether to transfer juveniles to adult court. Id. 
at 68.  
38. The factors enumerated in Kent included:  
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether 
the protection of the community requires waiver;  
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner;  
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, 
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if 
personal injury resulted;  
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence 
upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be 
determined by consultation with the United States Attorney);  
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court 
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be 
charged with a crime;  
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by 
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and 
pattern of living.  
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous 
contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, 
juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this 
Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions;  
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of 
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed 
the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities 
currently available to the Juvenile Court. 
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966). The factors are classified into two 
categories danger to the public and amenability to treatment. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra 
note 8, at 63. Opponents argue that these factors do not limit the latitude of the juvenile 
court judges as they are "broad, standardless grants" that "do not provide objective 
indicators to guide discretion." Barry C. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections 
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on Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers, Judicial Activism, and Legislative Default , 8 LAW & 
INEQ. J. 1, 15 (1989). This subjectivity allows inequities to occur without checks and 
balances. Id. Waiver statutes of one jurisdiction are interpreted differently from court to 
court within the jurisdiction. Id.  
39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). This decision markedly altered the nature of juvenile court 
proceedings and juvenile justice itself. It is considered the leading juvenile case with 
respect to constitutional law. JOSEPH J. SENNA & LARRY J. SIEGEL, JUVENILE LAW: 
CASES AND COMMENTS 270 (1976). Gault provided juvenile offenders with many of the 
basic constitutional rights that adults enjoy, including the right to counsel, notice, cross-
examination of witnesses and self-incrimination privileges.  
The facts of Gault involved the police taking fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault and his friend 
into custody after a neighbor filed a verbal complaint alleging that the pair called her on 
the telephone and made lewd and indecent remarks to her. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. Gerald at 
the time was already on probation for accompanying another juvenile who stole a wallet 
from a lady's purse. Id. When police picked Gerald up, they took him to a detention 
home. Id. Meanwhile, Gerald's parents, who were at work when their son was detained, 
did not discover his whereabouts until they searched the neighborhood later that evening. 
Id. They went to the detention home and were then notified of the allegations against 
Gerald, and that a hearing would be held the next afternoon. Id.  
The Gaults were not served with a formal notice of the charges against Gerald until the 
day of the habeas corpus proceeding, some three months after the initial hearing. Id. The 
notice provided no factual information for the court action taken against Gerald and at the 
initial hearing, the neighbor who brought the complaint was not present, no transcript or 
recording was made of the hearing and Gerald was not represented by counsel. Id. at 5-6. 
The Court kept Gerald at the detention home following the initial hearing, and for three 
additional days, without providing a reason for the detention. Id. at 6. An officer then 
mailed a note to the Gaults stating that the delinquency hearing for Gerald would 
continue on a specified date. Id. During this later hearing, the juvenile court judge 
adjudicated Gerald "delinquent" based on the Arizona Adult Criminal Code section 
declaring one guilty of a misdemeanor when using vulgar or obscene language in the 
presence or hearing of a child or a woman. Id. at 8. The penalty for this violation for an 
adult was a $5 to $50 fine. Id. at 9. The juvenile court judge justified his adjudication 
against Gerald through a definition of delinquency in the code as "one who is habitually 
involved in immoral matters" and disturbing the peace. Id. Gerald's previous "immoral 
matter" was a juvenile referral two years prior regarding Gerald's possibly stealing a 
baseball glove and lying to police about it. Id. However, no hearing was held on the 
matter, and no accusation was made, as insufficient grounds existed to file a petition. Id. 
The juvenile court judge committed Gerald to State Industrial School until age 21. Id. at 
8. Arizona law did not permit appeals in juvenile cases. Id. at 9. The Gaults filed a writ of 
habeas corpus, but the Superior Court and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the motion. 
Id.  
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Before the United States Supreme Court, the Gaults sought to invalidate the Arizona 
Juvenile Code on its face, or in its application, because it was contrary to the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 10. It was argued that the Code violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a child was taken from his parents' custody and sent to an 
institution by a juvenile court judge, acting with unlimited and unbridled discretion to 
deny the child his basic rights of notice of the charges, right to counsel, right to 
confrontation and cross -examination, privilege against self-incrimination, right to a 
transcript of the proceedings and right to appellate review. Id. The Court held that a 
juvenile should retain all of the above rights, except the right to a transcript and appellate 
review. Id. at 33-34, 36, 55, 56. The juvenile did not possess a basic constitutional right 
to a recording of the proceedings nor appellate review, as this would place a burden on 
habeas corpus by forcing the appellate courts, as well as the juvenile judges, to 
reconstruct a record. Id. at 58.  
40. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative 
Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 483 (1987). 
Feld states that:  
[d]espite the Supreme Court's reluctance to hasten the demise of the 
juvenile court in McKeiver, its earlier decisions in Gault and Winship 
imported the adversarial model and the primacy of legal guilt as a 
constitutional prerequisite to coercive intervention and drastically altered 
the form and function of the juvenile court. By emphasizing procedural 
regularity in the determination of criminal guilt as a prerequisite to a 
delinquency disposition, the Court altered the focus of the juvenile court 
from the Progressive's emphasis on the "real needs" of a child to proof of 
the commission of criminal acts.  
Id.  
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967). The Court described adequate and timely 
notice required for juveniles as "notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate 
in a civil or criminal proceeding." Id. at 33. Gerald Gault and his parents were deprived 
such notice as formal notice of the charges was not given to them until the initial hearing, 
which was a hearing on the merits in this case. Id. Gerald was held at a detention home 
after police picked him up, and it was not until later in the evening, after his parents 
returned home from work, that they searched for their son and discovered that he was in 
custody. Id. at 5. Gerald's mother and brother went to the detention home, and then 
learned of the incident and that a hearing was to be held the next afternoon. Id.  
42. Id. at 36. The Court held that "a proceeding where the issue is whether the child will 
be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable 
in seriousness to a felony prosecution." Id. The Court concluded that in situations where 
the child's freedom is restricted, the child and his parents have to be notified of the child's 
right to counsel or, if they are indigent, that an attorney will be appointed for them. Id. at 
41. In this case, although Mrs. Gault testified that she knew she could have hired an 
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attorney for the juvenile hearing, the Court ruled this was not waiver of the right to 
counsel as it was necessary for the court to confront Mrs. Gault with her right to an 
attorney, her right to have an attorney appointed for her if they were indigent, and the 
consideration of whether or not she was waiving the right to counsel. Id. at 42.  
43. Id. at 56. The Court held that without a valid confession adequate to support the 
determination of the Juvenile Court, confrontation and sworn testimony by witnesses 
available for cross-examination were essential for a finding of delinquency and an order 
committing Gerald to a state institution for a maximum of six years. Id. No difference 
existed in affording juveniles these rights than in providing them to adults under the 
Constitution. Id. In the present case, the complainant, Mrs. Cook, was not present to be 
cross-examined by Gerald, nor did she speak to the juvenile judge at any time. Id.  
44. Id. at 55. Gerald had admitted to the juvenile judge at the habeas corpus proceeding 
that he made some of the indecent remarks, but conflict existed as to just what Gerald 
admitted, because witnesses at the proceeding testified differently regarding what Gerald 
had confessed, and no record or transcript of the proceeding was taken. Id. at 43. 
Regarding the self-incrimination privilege, Justice Fortas emphasized that it means more 
than merely preventing the use of coerced and thus unreliable confessions. Id. at 47. 
Justice Fortas observed that, "one of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force 
or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under 
investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in 
securing his conviction." Id. He further held that the language of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments state that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself," and juvenile delinquency proceedings may lead to state institutional 
commitment and thus could be determined criminal in nature. Id. at 50. Also, juvenile 
proceedings may lead to waiver to adult criminal courts. Id. at 50-51.  
45. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967). "The observance of due process standards, 
intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or 
displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Id. Justice Black, in his 
dissent, commented on the majority opinion by stating that "[t]his holding strikes a well-
nigh fatal blow to much that is unique about the juvenile courts in this Nation." Id. at 60 
(Black, J., dissenting). If this holding did not totally change the juvenile justice system, it 
at least clouded the distinctions between it and the adult system.  
46. Id. at 13. It is suggested that the Gault Majority sought to formalize the juvenile court 
procedures in the adjudicatory delinquency phase without impacting upon the juvenile 
system's emphasis on individualized rehabilitation in other proceedings. See Rossum, 
supra note 14. Rossum states that the Gault Court failed to decide the most controversial 
issue in the case: "whether dispositions should be related to specific acts." Id. Ohio 
answered this question in State v. Watson, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1989) (holding a 
juvenile judge can consider the specific facts of a case in deciding whether or not to 
transfer the case to adult court). In 1994, Ohio codified this decision in Juv. R. 30(F)(6) 
(Baldwin 1995).  
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47. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). This case involved a twelve-year-old boy who stole $112.00 
from a women's purse located in a locker. The petition charged Samuel Winship with 
delinquency, because if an adult had committed this act the charge of larceny would 
apply. Id. at 360. The New York Family Court judge admitted that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt was lacking in the case, but held that such proof was not required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and instead relied on the New York Family Court Act standard 
of preponderance of the evidence. Id. The Winships argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency 
adjudications involving confinement, but did not succeed. Id.  
48. Id. at 368. The Court, per Justice Brennan, held that the reasonable doubt standard, 
like those constitutional rights enumerated in Gault , is required in an adjudicatory 
hearing where a child's liberty may be at stake. Id.  
49. Id. at 365-66. The Court reiterated the position it stressed in Gault that:  
civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for 
criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for "[a] proceeding 
where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and 
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to 
a felony prosecution." 
In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). Justice Brennan also believed, as stressed in Gault, 
that providing juveniles with the constitutional protection of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt would not destroy the juvenile system's unique protections and aspects. Winship, 
397 U.S. at 366.  
50. See Rossum, supra note 14. The standards of procedure the Court required in these 
cases also negatively affected the juvenile system's goal of rehabilitation of the offender. 
Id. The decisions set forth a new way of looking at the juvenile. In most instances, the 
juvenile is no longer considered not responsible for his acts because he lacks the mental 
capacity required for the crime. Id. A shift away from offender-oriented treatment of the 
juvenile occurred after these cases and a growing trend toward focusing on the offense 
emerged. Id.  
51. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). This case involved a petition against a seventeen-year-old boy, 
alleging that he committed an act with a deadly weapon, that if committed by an adult, 
would establish the crime of robbery. Id. The juvenile court conducted an adjudicatory 
hearing and, after hearing Jones and two prosecution witnesses, determined that the 
allegations against Jones were true. Id. at 522. At a later disposition hearing, the juvenile 
judge, after evaluating the probation officer's report and testimony on the case, declared 
Jones unfit for treatment under the juvenile system as he was unamenable to its care and 
treatment and ordered that the adult criminal court prosecute him. Id. at 524. Jones 
unsuccessfully argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented trying him at the 
juvenile adjudicatory hearing and then trying him again in adult court. Id. The California 
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Superior Court convicted Jones of robbery and committed him to the California Youth 
Authority. Id. at 525.  
52. Id. at 537. The Breed Majority held that prosecuting a juvenile in adult court for  
the same offense after a juvenile adjudicatory proceeding violated the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 537-38.  
We require only that, whatever the relevant criteria, and whatever the 
evidence demanded, a State determine whether it wants to treat a juvenile 
within the juvenile court system before entering upon a proceeding that 
may result in an adjudication that he has violated a criminal law and in a 
substantial deprivation of liberty, rather than subject him to the expense, 
delay, strain, and embarrassment of two such proceedings.  
Id. at 537-38. This does not mean, however, that a state cannot gain "substantial" 
evidence that the juvenile committed the offense before deciding to transfer the juvenile. 
The state can do so as long as it is not done in an adjudicatory procedure. Id. at 538 n.18. 
Commentators note that, at this point, the Court believed that enough was proven to be 
wrong with the juvenile justice system warrant application of some of the constitutional 
protections guaranteed to adult criminal defendants. FRANK W. MILLER ET AL., THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESS 468 (2d ed. 1976).  
53. Breed, 421 U.S. at 529.  
We believe that it is simply too late in the day to conclude, as did the 
District Court in this case, that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a 
proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has committed acts 
that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include both 
the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty 
for many years.  
Id. The Court compared the adjudicatory hearing to a criminal prosecution, noting little 
difference in the consequences between the two, as both produce strain on the individual, 
insecurity and anxiety, i.e., risks that the Double Jeopardy Clause strives to insulate from 
offenders. Id. at 530-31.  
54. Id. at 537. Once again, it is stated that providing this constitutional requirement will 
not mitigate the juvenile system and its unique procedures and philosophy. Id. Justice 
Burger noted that most state courts had already required that transfer proceedings occur 
prior to the adjudicatory hearing, and those that did not had experienced problems with 
the procedures. Id. The only additional burden placed upon the juvenile court, as a result 
of this decision, would be duplication of some of the relevant evidence proven at the 
transfer proceeding to show unfitness if the juvenile court held a transfer hearing and 
rejected waiver to adult court. Id. at 539. The Court mitigates this burden by the fact that 
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those cases that are transferred will require no more of the juvenile court's energy or 
resources. Id.  
55. 403 U.S. 528 (1970). This case involved consolidation of several cases. Joseph 
McKeiver, aged sixteen, was charged with robbery, larceny and receiving stolen goods, 
after participating with other juveniles in following three teens and taking twenty-five 
cents from them. At his adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court, an attorney represented 
Joseph and requested a jury trial, which the Family Court judge denied. Id. at 535. A 
second case involved Edward Terry, aged fifteen, who was charged with conspiracy and 
assault and battery of a police officer, after striking a police officer with a stick and his 
fists when the officer stopped a fight that Terry and his friends were watching. Id. at 535-
36. His attorney's request for a jury trial was denied as well. Id. at 535. Another case 
consolidated involved 46 African-American children, ages eleven to fifteen, charged with 
willfully impeding traffic after they held a series of demonstrations in protest of school 
assignments and school consolidations. The Family Court in that case also denied the 
attorney's request for a jury trial. Id. at 537. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that 
no right to a jury trial existed in juvenile court. Id. at 535-36.  
56. Id. at 528. The Court decided this case in 1971, before the Breed case. It was thought 
that expansion of juvenile rights ended when the Court ruled on McKeiver. SENNA & 
SIEGEL, supra note 38, at 228. Breed represents continuing Court expansion of 
constitutional protections to juveniles on a case-by-case basis. Id.  
57. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545. Justice Blackmun concluded that "Despite all of these 
disappointments [in the juvenile justice system], all these failures, and all these 
shortcomings, we conclude that trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is 
not a constitutional requirement." Id. Many critics of this opinion believe that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial should extend to juveniles. See Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., 
The Right to a Public Jury Trial: A Need for Today's Juvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 
230 (1993) (making the argument that it is necessary to have not only a jury trial in the 
juvenile courts, but also a public jury trial). See also Korine L. Larsen, Comment, With 
Liberty and Juvenile Justice for All: Extending the Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile 
Courts , 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 835 (1994).  
58. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550. Noting that what might appear down the road may be a 
merger of the juvenile system into the adult criminal system, Justice Blackmun did not 
give affirmance to such an action for this case. Id. at 551.  
59. SENNA & SIEGEL, supra note 38, at 329. The McKeiver Court failed to consider "the 
possible advantages due to increased formality in juvenile proceedings; whether its 
earlier decision in Gault had effectively foreclosed renewed concern with flexibility and 
informality; nor why formality at the adjudication stage was incompatible with 
therapeutic dispositions." Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of 
Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 830 
(1988). Feld notes that in McKeiver, the Court was hesitant to expedite the destruction of 
the juvenile system, even though the Gault and Winship decisions already began the 
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juvenile court's change in procedure and substance. Id. at 831. Although holding that 
juveniles who requested a jury trial were not constitutionally entitled to one, the Court 
left the decision to allow jury trials in juvenile courts up to the states. CHAMPION & 
MAYS, supra note 8, at 130. As a result, about one-fourth of the states now have 
legislation allowing jury trials in juvenile courts. Id.  
60. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 8, at 135. In fact, 83% of Americans believe that 
two and three-time juvenile offenders should receive sentences equal to adult offenders, 
and many believe that juveniles who commit murder should receive the death penalty. 
Patricia Edmonds, To Some, Ultimate Penalty is Ageless, USA Today , Sept. 28, 1994, at 
11A. Some critics even support total abolition of the juvenile court system. See Janet E. 
Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructuring the Legal Order: The Case 
for Abolishing the Juvenile Court , 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991). Ainsworth suggests 
that changing perceptions of childhood in the late twentieth century have "undermine[d] 
the ideological legitimacy of a separate juvenile court system." Id. at 1084. Other 
opponents to the juvenile justice system contend that because minors participate in many 
illegal adult activities, they should be held accountable for their actions. See Larry A. 
DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the "Infancy Law Doctrine": From Incapacity to 
Accountability , 21 OHIO N.C. L. REV. 481 (1994).  
61. Although some believe that this combination of constitutional guarantees in the 
parent -like atmosphere of the juvenile court gives a great advantage to juveniles, data 
suggests the contrary. As Justice Fortas, in Kent v. United States , recognized: "There is 
evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst 
of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous 
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). Even 
though the safeguards in juvenile court resemble the criminal courts' procedural 
protections, "in reality, the justice routinely afforded juveniles is lower than the minimum 
insisted upon for adults." Feld, supra note 22, at 692. Feld argues that a separate juvenile 
court is no longer necessary because of the merging of the adult protections into the 
juvenile system, thereby eliminating differences in the approach of the two systems to its 
offenders. Id. at 693.  
62. Between 1983 and 1992, juveniles contributed to a 25% increase in murders, forcible 
rapes and robberies. Howard N. Snyder, OJJDP, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Are Juveniles 
Driving the Violent Crime Trends? (Fact Sheet No. 16, May 1994). The Honorable 
George Bundy Smith, Associate Judge for the Court of Appeals of New York, and Justice 
Gloria M. Dabiri, of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, have noted that 
juveniles are committing more serious crimes, and at a much younger age. George Bundy 
Smith & Gloria M. Dabiri, The Judicial Role in the Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents , 3 
J. L. & POL'Y 347, 360 (1995). In this article, the authors present the debate of the 
arguments between those who propose treating juveniles as adults in the adult system and 
those who support the rehabilitative approach of the juvenile court system for all 
juveniles. Id. at 348.  
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 29 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol29/iss2/7
63. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 8, at 135. Despite the increased use of transfer, the 
authors conclude that it is merely a facade, as leniency for the juvenile appears at all 
stages in the adult court. Id. The transfer merely gives "the appearance of greater 
toughness in dealing with juvenile offenders." Id. Others believe that adult courts are just 
as tough on juvenile transferees as on adult offenders. Interview with Donna McCollum, 
Mahoning County Juvenile Court Prosecutor, Youngstown, OH (Sept. 20, 1995). The 
judge considers the age of the transferee, but it does not play a significant role in the 
judge's sentencing decision.  
64. Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869) (acknowledging the philosophy with regards 
to the state's power to commit juveniles to reform schools). Prosecutor McCollum 
favored the reformatory laws that allowed the juvenile system to confine the juvenile 
offender to a reformatory for a period beyond the age of twenty-one. If a longer sentence 
was necessary to rehabilitate the juvenile offender, the juvenile system could maintain the 
youth until the age of twenty-five. Interview with Donna McCollum, Mahoning County 
Juvenile Court Prosecutor, Youngstown, OH (Sept. 20, 1995).  
65. 95 Ohio Laws 785 (1902).  
66. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 22. See also 99 Ohio Laws 192 (1908); 98 
Ohio Laws 314 (1906); 97 Ohio Laws 561 (1904). This system stayed intact until Ohio 
adopted the Standard Juvenile Court Act in 1937. KURTZ & GIANELLI , supra note 11, at 
22.  
67. The following cases held that the constitutional guarantees do not apply in a juvenile 
court setting: Cope v. Campbell, 196 N.E.2d 457 (Ohio 1964) (right to representation by 
counsel), overruled by In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d 808 (Ohio 1969); In re Darnell, 182 
N.E.2d 321 (Ohio 1962) (right to trial by jury); In re State v. Shardell, 153 N.E.2d 510 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1958) (right to protection against self-incrimination); State ex rel Peaks v. 
Allaman, 115 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio Misc. 1952) (right to bail). These rights did not apply to 
juvenile court procedures for the same reasons traditionally contended, because the 
juvenile system acts as a parent to the child, and is unique in nature as it provides for 
rehabilitation of the child and is not criminal in nature. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 
11, at 22.  
68. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 24. This conferred on the Court only the 
ability to create procedural rules, not substantive rules. However, the line between 
procedure and substance is thin, and the authors suggest that distinguishing between the 
two depends on the context in which the words are used. Id. Article IV, Section 5(B) of 
the Ohio Constitution provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall prescribe rules governing 
practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify any substantive right . . . . All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no 
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." OHIO CONST., art. IV, § 5(B). 
With this authority granted to the Ohio Supreme Court, it began to create the Juvenile 
Rules.  
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69. Juv. R. 47(A) (Baldwin 1995) (providing that the Juvenile Rules took effect on July 
1, 1972).  
70. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 25. The authors suggest that this revision 
ignored the intention that the Juvenile Rules and the Ohio Revised Code section relating 
to juveniles govern different legal ideas. Id. at 26.  
71. No dissension exists between the statute and the rule, even though provisions found in 
one are not always found in the other. In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the 
two should be construed together. See State v. Watson, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1989).  
72. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A)(1) (Baldwin 1995) (see infra note 77 for text); 
Juv. R. 30(D) (Baldwin 1995) (see infra note 77 for text). Only Revised Code § 2151.26 
recognizes mandatory transfers. OHIO REV. CODE ANN . § 2151.26(A)(2) (Baldwin 
1995) (see infra note 77 for text).  
73. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A)(1)(c)(i), (ii) (Baldwin 1995) ( infra note 77); 
Juv. R. 30(D) (Baldwin 1995) ( infra note 77). Discretionary transfers are more common, 
while mandatory transfers usually indicate a more serious crime, such as murder or 
aggravated murder. In determining the safety of the community, the juvenile court judge 
may consider the nature of the offense, the existence of aggravating circumstances, and 
the extent of any apparent pattern of anti-social conduct. State v. Oviedo, 450 N.E.2d 
700, 705 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) ("In the absence of specific guidelines in regard to this 
second factor [safety of the community] it is appropriate for the court to consider the 
nature of this offense, the existence of aggravating circumstances, and the extent of any 
apparent pattern of anti-social conduct."). See also State v. Carter, 272 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio 
1971) (In transfer order to adult court, the juvenile judge cited aggravated character of the 
offense of armed robbery.); State v. Harris, No. 81AP-299, 1981 WL 3505 (Ohio Ct. 
App., 10th Dist., Oct. 6, 1981) (court may consider the nature of the offense, which here 
included aggravated kidnapping and rape).  
74. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(B)(1) (Baldwin 1995). This section provides:  
The Court, when determining whether to transfer a case pursuant to 
division (A)(1) of this section, shall determine if the victim of the 
delinquent act was sixty-five years of age or older or permanently and 
totally disabled at the time of the commission of the act and whether the 
act alleged, if actually committed, would be an offense of violence, as 
defined in section 2901.01 of the Revised Code, if committed by an adult. 
Regardless of whether or not the child knew the age of the victim, if the 
court determines that the victim was sixty-five years of age or older or 
permanently and totally disabled, that fact shall be considered by the court 
in favor of transfer, but shall not control the decision of the court. 
Additionally, if the court determines that the act alleged, if actually 
committed, would be an offense of violence, as defined in section 2901.01 
of the Revised Code, if committed by an adult, that fact shall be 
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considered by the court in favor of transfer, but shall not control the 
decision of the court. 
Id.  
Revised Code § 2901.01(I) defines an offense of violence as:  
(1) A violation of sections 2903.01, 2903.02, 2903.03, 2903.04, 2903.11, 
2903.12, 2903.13, 2903.21, 2903.22, 2905.01, 2905.02, 2905.11, 2907.02, 
2907.03, 2907.12, 2909.02, 2909.03, 2909.04, 2909.05, 2911.01, 2911.02, 
2911.11, 2911.12, 2917.01, 2917.02, 2917.03, 2917.31, 2919.25, 2921.03, 
2921.34, 2921.35, 2923.12 and 2923.13 of the Revised Code;  
(2) A violation of an existing or former municipal ordinance or law of this 
or any other state or the United States, substantially equivalent to any 
section listed in division (I) (1) of this section;  
(3) An offense, other than a traffic offense, under an existing or former 
municipal ordinance or law of this or any other state or the United States, 
committed purposely or knowingly, and involving physical harm to 
persons or a risk of serious physical harm to persons;  
(4) A conspiracy or attempt to commit, or complicity in committing, any 
offense under division (I) (1), (2), or (3) of this section. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(I) (Baldwin 1995).  
75. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (material on Kent v. United States). For 
the Ohio statute and juvenile rule containing similar criteria to those enumerated in Kent, 
see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A) and (B) (Baldwin 1995), infra notes 77 and 74 
and accompanying text; Juv. R. 30(D) and (F) (Baldwin 1995), infra notes 77 and 78 and 
accompanying text.  
For material on In Re Gault, see supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2125.26(D) (Baldwin 1995) provides the right to notice:  
Notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of any hearing held 
pursuant to division (A) of this section shall be given to the child's parents, 
guardian, or other custodian and his counsel at least three days prior to the 
hearing. 
Id. Juv. R. 30(C) (Baldwin 1995) also acknowledges the right:  
Notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of any hearing held 
pursuant to division (A) or (B) of this rule shall be given to the state, the 
child's parents, guardian, or other custodian and the child's counsel at least 
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three days prior to the hearing, unless written notice has been waived on 
the record. 
Id. For right to counsel, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (Baldwin 1995), which 
in relevant part provides:  
A child, his parents, custodian, or other person in loco parentis of such child is entitled to 
representation by legal counsel at all stages of proceedings and if, as an indigent person, 
he is unable to employ counsel, to have counsel provided for him pursuant to Chapter 120 
of the Revised Code.  
Id. Although no Ohio statute or juvenile rule directly states the confrontational rights of 
juveniles, it is implied from the negative right of the juvenile offender to be excused from 
attendance at the hearing in Revised Code § 2151.35(A) and Juvenile Rule 27(A). 
KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 193. Although no statutory or juvenile rule 
provision discusses or grants the right to the self-incrimination privileges, an Ohio 
appeals court held that incriminating matters or statements made by a juvenile in relation 
to submission to a mental examination could not be used against him for any procedure 
other than the examination. State ex rel a Juvenile v. Hoose, 539 N.E.2d 704 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1988).  
See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (information relating to In Re Winship). 
Ohio sets out a "reasonable grounds to believe" standard with respect to amenability to 
rehabilitation and the safety of the community. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2151.26(A)(1)(c) (Baldwin 1995) (infra note 77 and accompanying text).  
See supra notes 57-54 and accompanying text (regarding Breed v. Jones and the right of 
protection of juveniles against double jeopardy in transfer proceedings held after a child 
already found delinquent at the adjudicatory hearing). Ohio lacks a statute and juvenile 
rule directly providing such a protection, but Ohio appellate courts have ruled that the 
double jeopardy protection applies in certain juvenile procedures. See Sims v. Engle, 619 
F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936 (1981) (holding that delinquency 
finding after transfer hearing was violation of double jeopardy protection). The statute 
allowing such procedure was amended shortly thereafter. See KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra 
note 11, at 163.  
76. Ohio statutes and juvenile rules are in agreement with the decision in McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial. For information regarding 
McKeiver, see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. See also OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2151.35(A) and Juv. R. 27(A) (Baldwin 1995) (both providing in relevant part, 
"[t]he court shall hear and determine all cases of children without a jury."). Judge 
Saundra J. Robinson of the Summit County Juvenile Court agrees that juveniles should 
not be afforded a constitutional right to a jury trial as the juvenile process is not 
considered criminal, but treatment-oriented. She also believes that the juvenile courts are 
ill-equipped to handle jury trials, as more money, judges, magistrates and other personnel 
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would be needed. Interview with Judge Saundra J. Robinson, Summit County Juvenile 
Court, Akron, OH (Sept. 27, 1995).  
77. KURTZ & GIANELLI, supra note 11, at 147. At this hearing, the juvenile court judge 
determines if probable cause exists to believe that the child committed a felony, and that 
the child is the person who committed the felony. Id. at 140-41. Both OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2151.26(A) (Baldwin 1995), and Juv. R. 30(A) and (D) (Baldwin 1995), address 
this hearing. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (A) provides:  
(A) (1) Except as provided in division (A) (2) of this section, after a 
complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child for 
committing an act that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, 
the court at a hearing may transfer the case for criminal prosecution to the 
appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense, after making the 
following determinations: 
(a) The child was fifteen years of age or older at the time of the 
conduct charged;  
(b) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the 
act alleged;  
(c) After an investigation, including a mental and physical 
examination of the child made by a public or private agency or a 
person qualified to make the examination, and after consideration 
of all relevant information and factors, including any fact required 
to be considered by division (B) (2) of this section, that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that: 
(i) He is not amenable to care or rehabilitation or further 
care or rehabilitation in any facility designed for the care, 
supervision, and rehabilitation of delinquent children;  
(ii) The safety of the community may require that he be 
placed under legal restraint, including, if necessary, for the 
period extending beyond his majority.  
Id. Juv. R. 30(A) (Baldwin 1995) provides:  
In any proceeding where the court may transfer a child fifteen or more years of age for 
prosecution as an adult, the court shall hold a preliminary hearing to determine if there is 
probable cause to believe that the child committed the act alleged and that the act alleged 
would be a felony if committed by an adult. The hearing may be upon motion of the 
court, the prosecuting attorney, or the child.  
Id. Juv. R. 30(D) (Baldwin 1995) states:  
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The proceedings may be transferred if the court finds there are reasonable 
grounds to believe both of the following:  
(1) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in any facility 
designed for the care, supervision, and rehabilitation of delinquent 
children;  
(2) The safety of the community may require that the child be placed 
under legal restraint for a period extending beyond the child's majority. 
Id.  
If probable cause is determined to exist, the procedure is continued until a full 
investigation is conducted. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN . § 2151.26(A)(1)(c) (Baldwin 
1995). Juv. R. 30(B) (Baldwin 1995) also provides for an investigation:  
If the court finds probable cause, it shall continue the proceedings for full 
investigation. The investigation shall include a mental and physical 
examination of the child by a public or private agency or by a person 
qualified to make the examination. When the investigation is completed, a 
hearing shall be held to determine whether to transfer jurisdiction. 
In both the statute and the rule, if the minor is under the age of fifteen, the child must 
remain in the juvenile system. If fifteen or older, the child may be transferred to the 
criminal court. If the child had previously committed aggravated murder or murder, and 
is alleged to have done so again, the judge must transfer the case to criminal court, 
regardless of the age of the juvenile. OHIO REV. CODE ANN . § 2151.26(A)(2) (Baldwin 
1995). Further, discretionary transfer can only occur if the complaint (petition) alleged 
that the juvenile committed an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult. Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.26(A) (Baldwin 1995); Juv. R. 30(A) (Baldwin 1995).  
78. The juvenile judge at the second hearing evaluates the juvenile's amenability to 
rehabilitation within the juvenile system. OHIO REV. CODE ANN . § 2151.26(A)(1)(c)(i) 
(Baldwin 1995). If the juvenile is considered amenable, then a adjudicatory hearing is 
held on the merits of the case, which is similar to the adult criminal trial. Juv. R. 30(E) 
(Baldwin 1995) provides that "[i]f the court retains jurisdiction, it shall set the 
proceedings for hearing on the merits." Id.  
Mixed opinions exist as to whether the same judge in the amenability hearing can hear 
the merits in the subsequent procedure. Some argue that it is unfair for the same judge to 
conduct the adjudicatory hearing, while others contend that no partiality exists. See 
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS 
RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS 49 (1980).  
Juv. R. 30(F) (Baldwin 1995) sets forth the factors that the juvenile judge uses in 
evaluating amenability to rehabilitation:  
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In determining whether the child is amenable to the treatment or 
rehabilitative processes available to the juvenile court, the court shall 
consider the following relevant circumstances;  
(1) The child's age and mental and physical condition;  
(2) The child's prior juvenile record;  
(3) Efforts previously made to treat or rehabilitate the child;  
(4) The child's family environment;  
(5) The child's school record;  
(6) The specific facts relating to the offense for which probable 
cause was found, to the extent relevant to the child's physical or 
mental condition.  
Id.  
79. OHIO REV. CODE ANN . § 2151.26(A)(2) (Baldwin 1995) provides:  
After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child 
for committing an act that would constitute aggravated murder or murder 
if committed by an adult, the court at a hearing shall transfer the case for 
criminal prosecution to the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the 
offense, if the court determines at the hearing that both of the following 
apply:  
(a) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the 
alleged act.  
(b) The child previously has been adjudicated a delinquent child 
for the commission of an act that would constitute aggravated 
murder or murder if committed by an adult.  
Id.  
It is assumed by the legislature in creating the crimes requiring mandatory transfers that 
the juvenile system cannot impose punishments that are severe enough. CHAMPION & 
MAYS, supra note 8, at 70. By placing the limits on the juvenile courts, legislatures have 
responded to public concern and attitudes regarding serious juvenile offenders. Id. In fact, 
many Americans believe that juveniles should receive adult penalties if a court convicts 
them two or more times. See Edmonds, supra note 60.  
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80. Juv. R. 30(F) (Baldwin 1995). In State v. Douglas , a sixteen-year-old male was 
charged with the crimes of rape and robbery, after forcing an eleven-year-old boy to have 
oral and anal sex with him and stealing the boy's jacket and calculator. 485 N.E.2d 711, 
711 (Ohio 1985). The juvenile court bound Douglas over to adult court without 
specifically addressing in its journal entry its written findings regarding the factors of 
Juvenile Rule 30(E) (now currently (F)). Id. at 712. The Ohio Supreme Court held that 
the court must consider each of the factors in Juvenile Rule 30(E) (now currently (F)), but 
it need not make written findings as to the factors as long as credible evidence exists to 
support the transfer. Id. The court also held that each and every one of the factors need 
not be resolved against the juvenile before transferring jurisdiction. Id. at 713. "Although 
the better practice would be to address each factor, as long as sufficient, credible 
evidence pertaining to each factor exists in the record before the court, the bind-over 
order should not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Id. at 712.  
Before State v. Watson, Juvenile Rule 30(F) (then (E)) contained only five factors the 
courts considered when determining amenability to treatment. 547 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 
(Ohio 1989). As a result of Watson, the rule was amended in 1994 to include a sixth 
factor; "the specific facts relating to the offense for which probable cause was found, to 
the extent relevant to the child's physical or mental condition." Juv. R. 30(F)(6) (Baldwin 
1995). For text of preceding five factors as well as the added factor considered to 
determine amenability to juvenile rehabilitation, see supra note 67.  
In Watson, a fifteen-year-old boy was convicted in criminal court for involuntary 
manslaughter and aggravated murder, after beating a boy in the head and body with a 
baseball bat and his fists. 547 N.E.2d at 1182-83. The juvenile court relinquished its 
jurisdiction on the basis of unamenability to juvenile treatment, even though the juvenile 
had no prior record, Anthony Watson's teachers testified that he caused no major 
discipline problems in school and was an average student, and relatives testified to his 
good character. Id. at 1183. Anthony argued that the juvenile court erred in consideration 
of the factor of safety of the community in determining his unamenability to juvenile 
treatment. He contended that the court is limited to considering only those factors 
enumerated in Juvenile Rule 30(F). Id. at 1183-84. The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed 
and held that the Rule requires evaluation of all the listed factors, but does not proscribe 
consideration of other relevant factors not enumerated. Id. at 1184. The court also held 
that the seriousness of the act is important in determining the child's amenability within 
the juvenile system. A juvenile who commits a major felony may need more time for 
rehabilitation than other juveniles, because inadequate time may exist to rehabilitate a 
juvenile offender within the juvenile system. Further, the nature of the act may be 
determinative of the child's mental health. Id. The Court concluded that "[g]enerally the 
greater the culpability of the offense, the less amenable will the juvenile be to 
rehabilitation." Id.  
81. In State v. Carmichael, the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that the juvenile court 
should have "considerable latitude to determine whether it should retain jurisdiction." 298 
N.E.2d 568, 569 (Ohio 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974). The court also held 
that the investigation to determine amenability "is not required to show that the child 
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cannot be rehabilitated as a juvenile but only that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that he cannot be rehabilitated." Id. at 572.  
82. Feld, supra note 38, at 15 (commenting "[j]udicial waiver statutes, couched in terms 
of amenability to treatment or dangerousness, are effectively broad, standardless grants of 
sentencing discretion characteristic of the individualized, offender-oriented dispositional 
statutes of the juvenile court."). Another commentator criticizes: "[t]he substantive 
standards are highly subjective, and the large number of factors that may be taken into 
consideration provides ample opportunity for selection and emphasis in discretionary 
decisions that shape the outcome of individual cases." Franklin Zimring, Notes Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Waiver, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 169, 193 (John Hall et al. 
eds., 1981) (compilation of articles regarding prosecuting juveniles in adult court). By 
emphasizing one criteria over the other and giving it more weight, juvenile judges can 
usually justify the decision made to transfer or not to transfer. TASK FORCE ON 
SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, 
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 56 (1978).  
Judge Saundra Robinson considers the totality of the circumstances as it is necessary to 
protect all juvenile offenders, especially first-time offenders. She states that the age of the 
juvenile, the prior delinquent history, the family support and the nature of the offense are 
important factors to consider. Interview with Judge Saundra J. Robinson, Summit County 
Juvenile Court, Akron, OH (Sept. 27, 1995). Prosecutor Donna McCollum agrees with 
Judge Robinson's evaluation, giving most weight to the age, prior delinquent history and 
seriousness of the offense. Interview with Donna McCollum, Mahoning County Juvenile 
Court Prosecutor, Youngstown, OH (Sept. 20, 1995).  
83. State v. Watson, 547 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 1989). The Court rejected the 
argument that the juvenile judge could consider only the factors enumerated in the law: 
"[t]here is no requirement that each, or any, or the five [now 6] factors in Rule 30 (E) 
[currently (F)] be resolved against the juvenile so long as the totality of the evidence 
supports a finding that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment." Id. The Court further 
provided:  
Rule 30 calls for a broad assessment of individual circumstances. 
Mechanical application of a rigidly defined test would not serve the 
purposes of the public or the juvenile. Further, reduction of the bindover 
decision to a formula would constrain desirable judicial discretion. We 
agree with appellant that Rule 30(E) requires consideration of all the listed 
factors, but we discern nothing in the rule, or in the policy it serves, which 
prohibits consideration of other relevant factors. 
Id.  
84. OHIO REV. CODE ANN . § 2151.26(F) (Baldwin 1995) provides:  
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Upon such transfer, the juvenile court shall state the reasons for the 
transfer and order the child to enter into a recognizance with good and 
sufficient surety for his appearance before the appropriate court for any 
disposition that the court is authorized to make for a like act committed by 
an adult.  
Id. Juv. R. 30(H) (Baldwin 1995) also recognizes that the judge's reasons for transfer 
must be stated by providing that "[t]he order of transfer shall state the reasons for 
transfer." Id.  
85. State v. Douglas, 485 N.E.2d 711, 712 (Ohio 1985). The Ohio Supreme Court held:  
Neither R.C. 2151.26 nor Juv. R. 30 requires the juvenile court to make 
written findings as to the five [now 6] factors listed in Juvenile Rule 30 
(E) [current (F)]. The rule simply requires the court to consider these 
factors in making its determination on the amenability issue. Although the 
better practice would be to address each factor, as long as sufficient, 
credible evidence pertaining to each factor exists in the record before the 
court, the bind-over order should not be reversed in the absence of an 
abuse of discretion.  
Id.  
86. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1009 (1995). Feld, Centennial Professor of Law at the 
University of Minnesota, notes that "[t]he inherent subjectivity in waiver criteria permits 
a variety of inequalities and disparities to occur without any effective check," and 
suggests that "[e]mpirical analyses provide compelling evidence that judges apply waiver 
statutes in an arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory manner." Id. In Feld's latest article, 
he discusses the Minnesota Juvenile Justice Task Force, reviewing its operation, 
purposes, recommendations and legislative changes. He critiques, supports and supplies 
insightful research into the transfer decision and its uselessness, among many other 
juvenile law topics. See id. Feld proposes the elimination of juvenile courts altogether, 
but believes that the court at sentencing should consider the age of the offender. He calls 
it "short sentences for short people." Mark Curriden, Hard Times for Bad Kids, 81 
A.B.A.J. 69 (1995) (discussing the "get tough" measures to help curb increasingly serious 
juvenile crime, with particular focus on Minnesota and its revamped juvenile justice 
system).  
87. Feld, supra note 38, at 46. One need not look further than our own state of Ohio to 
see the abuse of such discretion. In In the Matter of: Aaron Smith , Aaron, a seventeen-
year-old Michigan resident, was charged in Ohio with knowing possession of cocaine, 
and felonious assault. No. L-91-090, 1991 WL 270418 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist., Dec. 20, 
1991). The evidence presented at the amenability hearing consisted of a psychologist's 
testimony that Aaron was amenable to juvenile treatment and had a good attitude. The 
psychologist testified that Aaron desired to cooperate and try counseling. She believed 
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that a severe learning disability explained Aaron's poor attendance at school, and that it 
could be treated within the juvenile system. Id. at *3. Aaron's church pastor offered to 
supervise him in the community, and relatives and former employers wrote letters of 
Aaron's loyalty and reliability. Id. A forensic psychologist was inconclusive as to whether 
Aaron was amenable within the juvenile system, but concluded that the seriousness of the 
offense warranted transferring the case to adult court. Also, she believed Aaron to be a 
youth under another name whom the juvenile system failed to rehabilitate. Id. at *4. The 
Lucas County Court of Appeals ordered transfer of Aaron to the criminal court and 
justified its order on the basis that he had not attended school for the previous two years. 
Other factors determining transfer included the seriousness of the crime and the fact that 
Michigan law, where Aaron was a resident, would consider him an adult. Id. The Lucas 
County Court of Appeals ruled that "although some of the evidence would have justified 
a contrary decision, we will not second guess the juvenile court's discretion in such 
matters." Id. at *4. Here, overwhelming evidence existed favoring amenability within the 
juvenile system. But despite that evidence and the judge's acknowledgment that the case 
could have gone either way, Aaron lost an opportunity for rehabilitation because the 
juvenile judge decided he should not be in the juvenile justice system.  
88. See Feld, supra note 59, at 492. Feld notes, "[t]he empirical reality is that judges 
cannot administer these discretionary statutes on a consistent, evenhanded basis. Within a 
single jurisdiction, waiver statutes are inconsistently interpreted and applied from county 
to county and court to court." Id. How can the juvenile justice system's purpose and aims 
be met when such inconsistent applications exist?  
89. See Rossum, supra note 14. In Ohio, the juvenile court judge has the discretion to 
invoke a number of dispositions if a child is not transferred to adult court, but retained in 
juvenile court. The judge may place the child on probation, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2151.355(A)(2) (Baldwin 1995); commit the child to a county or private facility, such as 
a school or camp operated by the county or a private agency, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2151.355(A)(3) (Baldwin 1995); commit the juvenile to the Ohio Department of Youth 
Services for institutionalization, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355(A)(4) (Baldwin 
1995); impose a fine on the juvenile, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355(A)(7) (Baldwin 
1995); order the child to pay restitution for property damage, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2151.355(A)(8) (Baldwin 1995); suspend or revoke a driving permit or driver's license 
from the child, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355(A)(9) (Baldwin 1995); impose 
electronic monitoring on the child, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355(A)(10) (Baldwin 
1995); and make any further order upon the child that is proper, except placing the 
juvenile in a facility with adult offenders, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355(A)(11) 
(Baldwin 1995).  
90. Feld , supra note 59, at 486 (acknowledging that in the adult system, the "just 
desserts" philosophy has replaced rehabilitative efforts).  
91. OHIO REV. CODE ANN . § 2151.311(C)(2) (Baldwin 1995) provides:  
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If a child has been transferred to an adult court for prosecution for the 
alleged commission of a criminal offense, the child is convicted of a 
criminal offense, and sentence is imposed upon the child subsequent to the 
conviction, the child, during the period of time that he is subject to that 
sentence and for any action related to that sentence, may be held in a state 
penal institution, reformatory institution, or other place where an adult 
convicted of crime, under arrest, or charged with crime is held.  
Id. Juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities are victimized more often that those who 
return to juvenile facilities. Martin Forst et al., Youth in Prisons and Training Schools: 
Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 JUV. & FAM. 
CT. J. 1, 1-14 (1989). In addition, juveniles have more difficulties in adjusting to adult 
facilities, as evidenced by a study of juveniles incarcerated in Texas Department of 
Corrections' adult facilities, where juvenile inmates were twice as likely as the adult 
population to be problem inmates. Marilyn D. McShane and Frank P. Williams III, The 
Prison Adjustment of Juvenile Offenders, 35 CRIME AND DELINQ. 254-69 (1989).  
92. Boyce, supra note 17, at 995. Incarceration in an adult facility may increase a 
juvenile's violent tendencies upon return to society, if they were exposed to prison 
violence. Paul Marcotte, Criminal Kids, 76 A.B.A.J. 61, 65 (1990).  
93. See Elaine R. Jones, The Failure of the "Get Tough" Crime Policy, 20 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 803 (1995) (noting that as a result of the "Get Tough" policy of recent years in 
America, all we have to show for it is a growth in the rate of violent crimes by almost 
thirty-three percent between 1982 and 1991).  
94. 1,133,000 American Prisoners by 1994, OVERCROWDED TIMES, May 1990, at 1. In 
1980, only approximately 330,000 people in the United States were incarcerated. In 1972, 
only around 196,000 inmates comprised the prison population in the United States. See 
Tan C. Proband, 48,334 More Prisoners in 1991, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Aug. 1992, at 
1.  
95. Today experts estimate that over $20 billion dollars each year is spent on 
incarceration. See Jones, supra note 93. Building more prisons to house juvenile and 
adult offenders is not the answer, as evidenced by the past 10-15 years. Incarceration 
serves the purpose of incapacitation, but these individuals return to society armed with 
the knowledge and attitudes taught and shown them in prison. Id.  
96. Id. The United States has a growth rate of prison population that is ten times greater 
than that of the general population. Michael N. Castle, Intermediate Sanctions and Public 
Opinion, OVERCROWDED TIMES , May 1991, at 13.  
97. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency made this estimation. This figure is 
three-and-a-half times more than the prison population in 1980, when 330,000 
individuals were in prison. Jones, supra note 93.  
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98. Marcotte, supra note 92, at 65.  
99. See Ainsworth, supra note 60, at 1118. Ainsworth argues that:  
Once the imagined nature of childhood changed and the child-adult 
dichotomy blurred, however, the ideological justification for a separate 
juvenile jurisprudence evaporated. With its philosophical underpinnings 
no longer consonant with the current social construction of childhood, the 
juvenile court now lacks a rationale for its continued existence other than 
sheer institutional merit.  
Id. She believes that allowing juveniles to be tried in the adult courts will better protect 
them, as all of the constitutional guarantees denied them in juvenile court, such as a jury 
trial and record of the proceedings, will apply. Id. at 1121-30.  
Feld argues for abolition of the juvenile justice system as well. See Feld, supra note 86; 
Curriden, supra note 86. Feld sees the modern juvenile court, after applying the 
constitutional guarantees afforded adults to juveniles, as nothing more than "scaled-
down, second-class criminal courts for young people." Feld, supra note 83, at 966.  
Other opponents argue for abandonment of the juvenile system because juveniles are 
scared of the adult system, which may deter future criminality by the young offenders. 
Randall W. Besta & Paul J. Wintemute, Young Offenders in Adult Court: Are We Moving 
in the Right Direction?, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 476, 480-81 (1988). The authors recommend 
trying juveniles in the adult system, but impose sentences to juvenile facilities until the 
juvenile reaches the age of majority. Id. at 481. Regarding the effect of the adult court on 
the juvenile, one study confirmed that juveniles are afraid of adult court. See Barry 
Glassner et al., A Note on the Deterrent Effect of Juvenile vs. Adult Jurisdiction, 31 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS1219 (1983). Data concluded that juveniles quit committing crimes at 
age 16, under the mistaken belief that that is when they can go to jail. Id. Further, data 
showed that those juveniles 16 years and older found younger children to commit crimes 
for them because they felt "too old" to commit them themselves, obviously believing that 
adult punishment could ensue. Id.  
100. Proponents for the continuation of the juvenile system agree that reforms are 
necessary, but total abolition is not in the best interest of the children. Further, trying all 
juveniles in adult courts would have devastating effects on them, and the adult courts 
would not consider the juvenile's age when imposing a sentence. Irene Merker 
Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 
1993 WIS . L. EV. 163, 165-66 (1993). But cf. Feld, supra note 59, at 500-01 (arguing 
that when the juvenile judge transfers the child to adult court for more stringent 
punishment, the criminal courts usually respond by imposing more lenient sentences than 
the juvenile court would and usually treat most juveniles in the adult system as first-time 
offenders). Local juvenile officials disagree with Feld's assertion that youth offenders 
receive more lenient sentences based on age. Interview with Donna McCollum, 
Mahoning County Juvenile Court Prosecutor, Youngstown, OH (Sept. 20, 1995). In all of 
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cases transferred from juvenile court to criminal court, the judge did not give leniency to 
the juvenile because of his age. In fact, most juveniles bound over to criminal court 
received substantial sentences, some as long as forty years. Id.  
Other proponents argue that education is the key for deterring young offenders from a life 
of crime and association with the juvenile system. Bruce I. Wolford & LaDonna L. 
Koebel, Reform Education to Reduce Juvenile Delinquency , 9 CRIM. JUST. 2, 3 (1995). 
McCollum advocates preventive education and programming for children and early 
offenders. The programs in the juvenile system now are targeted at unruly first-time 
offenders and do not work on the older, more experienced, repeat offenders. Interview 
with Donna McCollum, Mahoning County Juvenile Court Prosecutor, Youngstown, OH 
(Sept. 20, 1995).  
101. Feld, supra note 86, at 1013 (suggesting that "[r]ather than relying on judicial 
discretion, the legislature should propound more objective waiver criteria to integrate 
juvenile and criminal court sentencing objectives, and to reduce the gap in intervention 
when youths make the transition between the two systems."). Feld recognizes that 
"Adolescence is a developmental continuum, and young people are not irresponsible 
children one day and responsible adults the next," id. at 1011, but nonetheless proposes 
abandoning the juvenile system altogether. See Curriden, supra note 86, at 69. It appears 
to be juvenile justice professionals themselves who vehemently oppose any effort to limit 
their discretion. See Rossum, supra note 14. Dr. Rossum, and Christopher Manfredi of 
McGill University, conducted a national survey regarding the juvenile crime problem and 
the juvenile system's handling of the problem. See RALPH A. ROSSUM ET AL., JUVENILE 
JUSTICE REFORM: A MODEL FOR THE STATES 113, 124-62 (1987). Of the 8,355 
criminal justice professionals responding, most believed that juvenile crime is a serious 
problem and that the system handles the problem ineffectively. However, that same 
majority opposed change in the system, and supported continuance of the juvenile court's 
informality and discretionary power. Id. at 157-60. Dr. Rossum concludes that:  
the respondents are willing to accept juvenile courts that are more offense-
oriented, so long as their own discretion is preserved. Put in the least-
flattering light, they are more willing to hold juveniles responsible for 
their acts than they are to hold themselves accountable for what they are 
doing to these juveniles.  
Rossum, supra note 14.  
102. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text for information relating to the 
increase in adult crime rates even though stricter policies and sentences have been 
instituted. The juvenile crime rate is not reduced by increased transfers to the adult 
system either, as Feld indicates in supra note 59, at 515-16 (noting that increased 
certainty of adult punishment of juveniles finds no decline in juvenile crime arrests).  
103. Juvenile Judge Saundra J. Robinson believes that her juvenile court is meeting its 
aim. She stresses that the difference between the juvenile justice system and the adult 
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system is that the juvenile system treats the juvenile as a child needing help, not as a 
criminal. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor supports Judge Robinson's assessment. Juvenile 
proceedings, in contrast to adult proceedings, have traditionally aspired to be "intimate, 
informal [and] protective." One reason for the traditional informality of juvenile 
proceedings is that the focus of sentencing is on treatment, not punishment. The 
presumption is that juveniles are still teachable and not yet "hardened criminals." United 
States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct 1329, 1343 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971)).  
Judge Robinson believes that discretion for the juvenile judge is absolutely necessary for 
the juvenile judge to serve the juvenile system's aim. She believes that most juveniles are 
guilty of "aggravated stupidity," meaning that most do not think before they act and give 
into peer pressure and their own selfishness. She comments, "We have selfish kids 
today." Interview with Judge Saundra J. Robinson, Summit County Juvenile Court, 
Akron, OH (Sept. 27, 1995).  
104. See infra note 105 (regarding amendment of the statute as a "get tough" response to 
crime in Ohio). For specific portion of amendment dealing with restrictions on juvenile 
judge discretion by use of mandatory transfers, see Amended Substitute House Bill 
Number 1, § 2151.26(B) (1995) [hereinafter H.B. 1].  
105. Representative Thomas, sponsor of this measure, calls the legislation a 
"comprehensive reform of Ohio's juvenile justice laws." OHIO SENATE JUDICIARY ON 
H.B. 1, 121ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at 2 (5/31/95). Although the new legislation 
amends twenty-eight statutes of the Ohio Revised Code relating to the juvenile court 
system's operation and procedures, this Comment limits itself to concentration only in 
areas relating to transfer and sentencing. Representative Thomas further commented that 
"Ohioans are fed up with increasing crime among teenagers," and noted that the largest 
increase in violent crime is committed by those between 16 and 18 years old. Id.  
106. Before setting out a summary of the text of H.B. 1, § 2151.26(B), it is necessary to 
define Category One offenses and Category Two offenses as they are used in this section 
and other H.B. 1 sections. H.B. 1, § 2151.26(A) provides definitions of Category One 
offenses and Category Two offenses. Category One offenses include violations of Ohio 
Revised Code §§ 2903.01 (aggravated murder), 2903.02 (murder), or any attempt to 
commit aggravated murder or murder. H.B. 1, § 2151.26(A)(1). Category Two offenses 
include violations of Ohio Revised Code §§ 2903.03 (voluntary manslaughter), 2905.01 
(kidnapping), 2907.02 (rape), 2907.12 (felonious sexual penetration), 2909.02 
(aggravated arson), 2911.01 (aggravated robbery), 2911.11 (aggravated burglary), or a 
violation of 2903.04 that is a first degree aggravated felony (involuntary manslaughter). 
H.B. 1, § 2151.26(A)(2).  
According to H.B. 1, § 2151.26(B) mandates that the juvenile court transfer the juvenile 
to adult court if, after a complaint is filed alleging the juvenile committed an act that 
would be considered a crime if committed by an adult and after a hearing, it determines 
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that the child was fourteen years of age or older, probable cause exists to believe the child 
committed the offense charged, and one of the following applies:  
(1) the juvenile previously pleaded guilty to or was convicted of a felony 
in criminal court.  
(2) The juvenile's place of residence would consider him/her an adult for 
criminal prosecution purposes without having to utilize the juvenile 
transfer process.  
(3) The juvenile is charged with a Category One offense and at least one 
of the following applies: 
(a) The juvenile was sixteen years of age or older at time of 
commission of the act.  
(b) The juvenile was previously adjudicated delinquent and 
committed to the Department of Youth Services for a prior 
Category One or Category Two offense. 
(4) The juvenile is charged with a Category Two offense, other than 
kidnapping, was sixteen years of age or older at the time of committing the 
act, and at least one of the following applies:  
(a) The juvenile was previously adjudicated delinquent and 
committed to the Department of Youth Services for a prior 
Category One or Category Two offense.  
(b) The juvenile possessed a firearm during the commission of the 
act and either displayed it, waved it, indicated possession of it, or 
used it when committing the act. 
H.B. 1, § 2151.26(B).  
Attorney General Betty Montgomery testified, at a House Judiciary and Criminal Justice 
committee meeting regarding this legislation, that between 1988-92, murder charges 
relating to juveniles have increased by 101%, and serious crimes have increased by 68% 
with seventeen as the peak age for arrests. HOUSE JUDICIARY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COMMITTEE MEETING REGARDING SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL NUMBER 1 (4/18/95). 
This legislation targets older, repeat juvenile offenders, and essentially says that the 
juvenile system will not tolerate their violent behavior anymore. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the automatic bindover only shuffles the problem off to another system that is too 
underfunded and overburdened to deal with it. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying 
text.  
107. See infra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.  
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108. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (current 2151.26(A)(2)).  
109. H.B. 1, § 2151.26(B), lowers the age of mandatory transferees from age fifteen or 
older in the current statute to age fourteen or older. Perhaps the age of fourteen was used 
as it reflects the common law distinction made of capacity based on age, where those 
fourteen years of age and older were held to the same standards of capacity and 
responsibility for criminal acts as adults. See supra note 10. Dr. William W. Friday, a 
clinical psychologist, opposed both the ages of fourteen and fifteen when he testified at 
the House Judiciary and Criminal Justice Committee Meeting in May, 1995, arguing that 
"fourteen and fifteen year-olds should not be bound over to the adult system because they 
do not have the ability to predict the outcome of their behavior." HOUSE JUDICIARY AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE MEETING REGARDING SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL 
NUMBER 1 (5/9/95). After reading a story in a Sacramento newspaper in 1992, California 
Attorney General Dan Lungren called his legislative director, Jack Stevens, and asked 
him to draft a bill to lower the transfer age for juveniles accused of murder from age 
sixteen to age fourteen. Mark Dowie, When Kids Commit Adult Crimes, Some Say They 
Should Do Adult Time , 13 CALIF. LAW. 55 (1993). The story that motivated Attorney 
General Lungren involved a twenty-five year-old college student, Michael Cannon, who 
was waiting for a train when two fifteen year-olds tried to rob him. Cannon told the boys 
he had no money and, as a consequence, one of the boys shot him at point-blank range in 
the forehead. Cannon died with eight cents in his pocket. After the boys were arrested, all 
one said was "Sorry it happened to the dude." Id. The bill, AB 136, which was drafted by 
Assemblyman Charles Quackenbush (R-Cupertino), received much debate and sparked a 
great deal of controversy. Dowie comments that this bill "signifies a change in thinking 
about children and crime. Children are increasingly seen as less innocent, more capable 
of distinguishing good conduct from bad, less likely to be changed for the better as the 
legal emphasis shifts from protecting and reforming the child to protecting society." Id. at 
56. Dowie also observes that this age lowering demonstrates an assumption that today's 
children "not only act but reason as adults." Id. at 58.  
110. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL NOTE & LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT OF 
SUB. H.B. 1, MANDATORY BINDOVER, EFFECTS ON DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH 
SERVICES (5/31/95). The Legislative Budget Office [hereinafter LBO] used the 
Department of Youth Services [hereinafter DYS] 1994 intake statistics to estimate the 
fiscal impact mandatory bind-over would have on it. This analysis discovered that 102 
juveniles in 1994 would have been subject to the new mandatory bind-over provisions. 
Id. Factoring in the $100 daily cost of confining each juvenile at DYS, the LBO projected 
a $3.6 million savings for DYS in the first year of implementation of mandatory bind-
over, a $4.66 million savings in the second year, and a $4.76 million savings in the third 
year. Id.  
111. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL NOTE & IMPACT STATEMENT ON SUB. 
H.B. 1, MANDATORY BINDOVER, EFFECTS UPON THEDEPARTMENT OF 
REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION (5/31/95). The LBO determined the effect of the 
mandatory bind-over provisions on the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
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[hereinafter DRC] by first assuming that all 102 juveniles projected to be subject to 
mandatory transfer in 1994 would receive sentences of incarceration in DRC. Id. The 
average annual cost of housing per DRC inmate was estimated at $13,682, but when only 
small additions to the population are made, a variable cost of $3,650 is assessed per 
inmate. Id. LBO estimated the additional cost to DRC after the first year of 
implementation of this new provision to be $372,000, after the fourth year to be $1.4 
million, after the ninth year to be $2.6 million and after the fifteenth year the amount 
would stabilize at $2.7 million. Id. This figure does not take into account any additional 
prison space that would be necessary for DRC to build in order to house more inmates 
over the years. Id.  
112. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL NOTE & IMPACT STATEMENT ON SUB. 
H.B. 1, MANDATORY BINDOVER, EFFECTS UPON THE DEPARTMENT OF 
REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION (5/31/95). LBO estimates that the DRC will have to 
build additional prison space six years after this legislation becomes effective, costing an 
extra $30-40 million. Id.  
113. The mandatory bind-over provision has its opponents, who argue that such a 
procedure is contrary to the established philosophy of the juvenile courts to treat 
juveniles as children in need of treatment. NANCY MCMILLEN, COUNCIL ON CHILDREN, 
YOUTH AND FAMILIES' LEGAL COMMITTEE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY AND 
REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE FEDERATION FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DONNA 
HAMPARIAN, OHIO COALITION FOR BETTER YOUTH SERVICES, HOUSE JUDICIARY 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON H.B. 1 (4/25/95). These two opponents 
criticized the effects that the mandatory bind-over provision would create, such as 
overcrowding and docket congestion, and a higher recidivism rate than the already high 
rate for children tried as adults. Ms. McMillen also noted that plea bargains would 
increase in the juvenile system so that offenders could stay within its confines, thus 
defeating the legislation's purpose. Id.  
114. Many support the mandatory provision as it allows judges a simple transfer 
procedure for those juveniles who commit serious crimes, which preserves the resources 
of the juvenile system for those who may be reformed. CAROL RAPP ZIMMERMAN, 
OHIO YOUTH SERVICES, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (7/11/95). Juvenile 
Prosecutor Donna McCollum advocated the mandatory transfer as well, indicating that 
the juvenile system is not equipped or funded to deal with the violent repeat juvenile 
offenders. Interview with Donna McCollum, Mahoning County Juvenile Court 
Prosecutor, Youngstown, OH (Sept. 20, 1995).  
115. In summary, H.B. 1, § 2151.26(C)(1), provides that, in those circumstances where 
transfer is not mandatory, a juvenile court may transfer a case to adult criminal court after 
a complaint is filed alleging a juvenile to be delinquent for committing an act that would 
be a felony if committed by an adult, and after the court determines all of the following:  
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(a) The juvenile's age was fourteen years or older at the time of 
commission of the act charged.  
(b) Probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile committed the act 
charged.  
(c) After an investigation of the juvenile, including a mental examination 
and consideration of all other relevant factors, the court finds reasonable 
grounds exist to believe that both of the following exist:  
(i) The juvenile is not amenable to the care or rehabilitation 
provided in the juvenile system.  
(ii) For the safety of the community, it may be necessary to place 
the juvenile in the system and perhaps keep the juvenile in that 
system beyond the age of majority.  
(2) When determining whether to order the transfer of a case for criminal 
prosecution to the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense 
pursuant to division (C) (1) of this section, the court shall consider all of 
the following factors in favor of ordering transfer of the case:  
(a) A victim of the act charged was five years of age or younger, 
regardless of whether the child who is alleged to have committed the act 
knew the age of the victim;  
(b) A victim of the act charged sustained physical harm to the victim's 
person during the commission of or otherwise as a result of the act 
charged.  
(c) The child is alleged to have had a firearm on or about the child's person 
or under the child's control while committing the act charged and to have 
displayed the firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the commission of 
the act charged, other than a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised 
Code.  
(d) The child who is alleged to have committed the act charged has a 
history indicating a failure to be rehabilitated following one or more 
commitments. 
Id.  
116. Those factors summarized in supra note 102 are almost identical to those of the 
current statute. One difference that exists is the lowering of the age to consider transfer 
from fifteen years to fourteen years. See supra note 104 and accompanying text 
(discussion on ramifications and current debate of lowering of age). The only other 
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difference, beside the imposition of the additional factors in favor of transfer, is the 
removal of the words "physical examination" from the language referring to the 
investigation that must be conducted to consider the amenability of the juvenile and the 
threat to public safety. See supra note 77 (current statutory language). In H.B. 1, § 
2151.26(C)(1)(c), the only examination expressed in the language is a mental 
examination. However, the language is not exclusive of other examinations, as it 
provides:  
After an investigation, including a mental examination of the child made 
by a public or private agency or a person qualified to make the 
examination, and after consideration of all relevant information and 
factors to be considered under division (C)(2) of this section, that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that both of the following criteria are 
satisfied:  
(i) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation or further care or 
rehabilitation in any facility designed for the care, supervision, and 
rehabilitation of delinquent children.  
(ii) The safety of the community may require that the child be placed 
under legal restraint, including, if necessary, for the period extending 
beyond the child's majority.  
H.B. 1, § 2151.26(C)(2).  
117. H.B. 1, § 2151.26(C)(2), requires the juvenile judge to consider all of the following 
factors, if they exist, in favoring transfer of the juvenile to adult court:  
(a) The victim was five years of age or younger.  
(b) The victim suffered physical harm due to the commission of the act.  
(c) The juvenile offender possessed a firearm when committing the act and 
displayed, waved, indicated possession of a firearm, or used it to facilitate 
the commission of the act.  
(d) The juvenile offender has a previous commitment to the juvenile 
system and the history indicates that rehabilitation within the system has 
failed.  
(e) The victim was sixty-five years of age or older or permanently and 
totally disabled.  
Id.  
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All of these factors are new, except subsection (e), which is contained in current Revised 
Code § 2151.26(B)(1). For text of this section, see supra note 74.  
Legislators most likely drafted and approved subsection (a) as a response to the 
increasing rate that children are becoming victims of violent crimes. Teenagers are more 
than twice as likely to become violent crime victims. Joanne C. Lin et al., Youth 
Violence: Redefining the Problem, Rethinking the Solutions, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
357, 357-58 (1994) (citing AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, COMMISSION ON 
VIOLENCE AND YOUTH, VIOLENCE AND YOUTH, PSYCHOLOGY'S RESPONSE 42 (1993)). 
In 1992, approximately 4,000 children were murdered in our country. Lin, supra, at 357 
(citing FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS tbl 2.4 
(1993)). It is estimated that one million children between the ages of twelve and nineteen 
are raped, robbed or assaulted per year. Lin, supra, at 357 (citing NATIONAL 
GOVERNORS' ASS'N, KIDS AND VIOLENCE 1 (1994)).  
Subsection (b) probably represents a stance against the increasing violence and injury 
associated with juveniles playing a larger role in committing more violent crimes. For 
statistics regarding just how large a role juveniles play, see supra note 5-7 and 
accompanying text (indicating arrest of 112,409 juveniles for violent crimes out of the 
641,250 violent crimes committed, and involvement in 16.3% of the total murders and 
17.5% of the total violent crimes in the United States in 1992).  
Subsection (c) most likely represents the increasing use of firearms by juveniles in the 
commission of crime. Between 1985 and 1994, the homicide rate for teens involved in 
firearm -related deaths increased over 150%. Lin, supra at 358 (citing Delbert Elliott, 
Youth Violence: An Overview, Address at the Aspen Institute's Children and Violence 
Conference (Feb. 1994)). Estimates reveal that gunfire injures or kills 30-67 children 
each day and, in 1991, 5,356 children died as a result of gunfire. THE CHILDREN'S 
DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN YEARBOOK 64 (1994).  
118. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (Juvenile Rule 30 factors and discussion).  
119. Age is an objective fact and two of the factors in H.B. 1, § 2151.26(C)(2), are based 
on merely discovering the age of the victim. See supra note 117. The physical harm 
section is objective, as emotional harm is not included in it, and perhaps a doctor's 
opinion can substantiate those injuries unable to be observed with the human eye. The 
firearm language of H.B. 1, § 2151.26(C)(2)(C), may be a problem in objectivity 
although it appears otherwise upon first glance. For text, see supra note 117. It is true that 
the judge must only determine if the juvenile possessed a gun at the time of the act and if 
such possession was indicated in committing the crime. Judge Saundra Robinson believes 
that the language of this section is unclear regarding "indicating possession," and makes a 
valid point. Interview with Judge Saundra J. Robinson, Summit County Juvenile Court, 
Akron, OH (Sept. 27, 1995). For example, if a child had a gun in his pants while 
committing the act, and it slipped out while committing the offense, would this section 
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apply in favor of transfer, as it may "indicate possession?" That may seem to be up to the 
judge, thus allowing the subjectivity that the statute appears to try to eliminate.  
120. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL NOTE & LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT OF 
SUB. H.B. 1, PERMISSIVE BINDOVER (5/31/95). The LBO concedes that the lowering of 
the age at which bindover is permitted, and the factors favoring bind-over, could produce 
an increase in the number of juveniles transferred under the permissive bind-over 
provision. Id. However, under the current permissive bindover law, the LBO notes that 
most offenders bound over are older in age, and provides support through a 1992 statistic 
wherein only ten children of two hundred eighty bound over were age fifteen. Id. Further, 
the LBO believes that the new factors incorporated into the permissive bind-over 
favoring transfer are already currently considered by judges in making the transfer 
decision, although not enumerated. Id. Despite these two favorable considerations, the 
LBO nonetheless predicts a small increase in juvenile transfers to adult courts. Fiscal 
effects resulting from this increase are greater adjudication costs, decreased costs to DYS 
and county juvenile systems for those bound over, and increased costs to adult systems 
for those bound over to it. Id.  
121. See supra notes 91 and 92 and accompanying text (the current statutory section and 
a discussion of effects of such incarceration).  
122. H.B. 1, § 2151.23(H)(2) provides:  
The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction shall house an inmate 
who is fourteen years of age or older and under eighteen years of age in a 
housing unit in a state correctional institution separate from inmates who 
are eighteen years of age or older, if the inmate who is under eighteen 
years of age observes the rules and regulations of the institution and does 
not otherwise create a security risk by being housed separately. When an 
inmate attains eighteen years of age, the Department may house the inmate 
with the adult population of the state correctional institution. If the 
Department receives too few inmates who are under eighteen years of age 
to fill a housing unit in the state correctional institution separate from 
inmates who are eighteen years of age or older, the Department also may 
assign to the housing unit inmates who are eighteen years of age or older 
and under twenty-one years of age. 
Id.  
123. Juvenile judge discretion is limited in deciding what to do with those children ages 
fourteen and older who commit certain violent crimes and have previous delinquent or 
adult histories for enumerated violent crimes. See supra note 106 and accompanying text 
(mandatory transfer amendment and criteria).  
124. The new legislation imposes no additional burdens on a juvenile judge's discretion 
in deciding how best to adjudicate a child who is a first-time offender or who has 
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committed a nonviolent offense. See supra note 115 and accompanying text 
(discretionary transfer amendment). Additional factors are imposed that a juvenile judge 
must consider in deciding to transfer a juvenile, but these are more objective 
determinations rather than subjective evaluations. See supra note 117 and accompanying 
text (factors imposed and a discussion of their objectivity). Allowing discretion in this 
manner returns the juvenile judge to the position for which the juvenile court was 
createdto help rehabilitate and treat the juvenile offender. For discussion of the juvenile 
court philosophy and its fading success, see supra notes 8-63, and 99-104 and 
accompanying text.  
Judge Smith and Judge Dabiri note the importance of the juvenile judge's discretion: 
"Judges, therefore, must be creative and flexible in fashioning dispositional orders which 
are tailored to address the individual needs of the juvenile." Smith & Dabiri, supra note 
62, at 374. They also conclude that although the juvenile judges role has changed 
throughout the years, "the judge who deals with criminal behavior by juveniles has a 
unique role to play by using his or her authority and influence to turn those potentially or 
actually delinquent children into productive citizens of our society." Id. at 378.  
125. See supra notes 60-62, 99 and accompanying text (discussion on abolition of the 
juvenile system altogether).  
126. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (Judge Saundra J. Robinson's opinion 
that the juvenile system is currently accomplishing its goals).  
127. Interview with Donna J. McCollum, Mahoning County Juvenile Court Prosecutor 
(Sept. 20, 1995). Prosecutor McCollum believes that the juvenile system does work for 
the majority of juvenile offenders, such as the first-time young offender, but the older 
repeat violent offender consumes most of the juvenile court's time, energy and resources, 
without much success in deterring the youth from recidivism. Id.  
128. See supra notes 103, 127. Richard N. White, Magistrate of the Mahoning County 
Juvenile Court, agrees with Prosecutor McCollum and cites many juvenile programs 
designed for first-time offenders that first-time offenders are not even able to use, as the 
repeat offenders are kept within the system and use these programs, even though they 
have no treatment or deterrent effect on them. Interview with Richard N. White, 
Mahoning County Juvenile Court Magistrate Place (Sept. 5, 1995).  
129. Carol Rapp Zimmerman, of Ohio Youth Services, agrees that a transitional system 
may be necessary for serious offenders. HOUSE JUDICIARY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COMMITTEE ON SUB. H.B. 1 (4/18/95). Feld discusses the proposal of a transitional 
system in Minnesota by its Task Force and its effectiveness. Feld, supra note 82, at 1038-
42. The new system will be a "more graduated juvenile justice system that establishes a 
new transitional component between the juvenile and adult systems . . . ." Id. at 1038. 
The new system applies to serious juvenile offenders and allows juvenile judges new 
dispositional methods. Id.  
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130. One commentator notes that, "Until the voting public can look beyond the 'just 
desserts' approach to juvenile justice, the juvenile crime rate in the United States will 
continue to escalate." Sharon K. Hamric-Weis, The Trend of Juvenile Justice in the 
United States, England, and Ireland, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 567, 577 (1995).  
131. Judge Martin, in listing criteria needed to help make the juvenile system effective 
once again, named at the top of the list "adequate funding for our youth correctional 
authorities" and "an experienced, caring and well-trained judiciary." Martin, supra note 
23, at 89.  
132. For LBO study and projections of money the juvenile treatment facility would save, 
see supra notes 110-111.  
133. Sentencing juveniles to adult facilities has a dramatic and far-reaching effect on a 
juvenile. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (examples of such effects). For 
this reason, such sentencing should be imposed only in rare instances, such as when a 
juvenile in the transitional system refuses treatment approaches or shows no signs of 
improvement from such treatment. Judge Martin believes that "laws that seek to transfer 
out of the juvenile system only those juveniles who are truly not amenable to treatment 
are far more likely to create a safer future for our society than laws that dispatch children 
who commit crimes into the jungle of contemporary adult corrections." Martin, supra 
note 23, at 89-90. He challenges that "[n]o informed person can seriously contend that an 
individual emerging, as virtually all prisoners ultimately do, from adult confinement will 
be less of a threat to society than the juvenile with a personalized treatment plan, retained 
in the juvenile system, subject to periodic review, for as long as that system requires to 
attain its rehabilitative goal." Id. at 91. A transitional system with treatment more intense 
than in the juvenile system, yet with the ability to punish if amenability is not effected, 
will provide even more confidence for society upon the release of these individuals. Feld 
comments that such a system will "give the juvenile one last chance at success in the 
juvenile system, with the threat of adult sanctions as an incentive not to re-offend." Feld, 
supra note 86, at 1038.  
134. In 1936, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[m]isdeeds of children are not looked 
upon in the Juvenile Court as crimes carrying conviction, but as delinquencies which the 
state endeavors to rectify by placing the child under favorable influences by the 
employment of other corrective measures." Malone v. State, 200 N.E. 473, 478 (Ohio 
1936). The Court reemphasized the goal of the juvenile justice system when it held that:  
The Juvenile Court stands as a monument to the enlightened conviction 
that wayward boys may become good men and that society should make 
every effort to avoid their being attained as criminal before growing to the 
full measure of adult responsibility. Its Existence, together with the 
substantive provisions of the Juvenile Code reflects the considered opinion 
of society that childish pranks and other youthful indiscretions, as well as 
graver offenses, should seldom warrant adult sanctions and that the 
decided emphasis should be upon individual, corrective treatment.  
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In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d 808, 810 (Ohio 1969).  
135. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
136. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. Ms. Zimmerman is on the right track to 
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